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INTRODUCTION

As political instability and violence grips the Middle East,
Western policy makers and scholars are confounded by how populist,
non-violent mass uprisings in the so-called "Arab Spring" ultimately
strengthened authoritarianism in the region. In particular, mass uprisings
that have come to be known as Egypt's "January 25 th Revolution"
produced little more than a switching of the guard in the presidential
palace. Because events in Egypt carry significant weight in the Middle
East, a close examination of its post-Arab Spring experiences offers
valuable insights into events unfolding in other Middle Eastern countries.
While attempting to predict Egypt's future would be a fool's
errand, there is much to learn from the past four years. Among the
various political actors shaping the post-January 25, 2011, political
landscape, Egypt's judges have proven to be among the most influential.
However, rule of law scholarship on the Middle East has yet to take into
account the role judges played in quashing Egypt's popular uprisings.
This Article attempts to fill that void in the literature.
An examination of the judiciary's role in Egypt's post-January 25 th
aftermath is a salient and under-researched topic that informs scholarship
on the judicialization of politics and its impact on rule of law in countries
undergoing political transitions. For instance, current scholarship on the
Egyptian judiciary is based largely on studies of human rights lawyers
and political opposition groups in the 1990s leveraging Egypt's highest
administrative and constitutional courts to expand political and social
rights.1 Indeed, civil society's reliance on the courts-as opposed to the
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1.

See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE

RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE

15 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006);

Tamir Moustafa, The Political Role of the Supreme Constitutional Court: Between
Principles and Practice, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT 91, 94 (Nathalie

Bemard-Maugiron ed., 2008) [hereinafter Moustafa, Principles].
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streets-to restrain authoritarian practices was due in large part to the
judiciary's liberal leanings within an illiberal political context. Although
Mubarak's regime granted the court some latitude as part of a broader
strategy of decreasing the political costs of the growing predatory state,
the courts' rulings nonetheless emboldened civil society to push for more
political rights.2 The human rights litigation in the two decades
preceding the January 2 5 th uprisings produced a protective constituency
that vigorously defended the courts against overt executive interference
in judicial independence. 3 As a result, students of Egypt's deteriorating
political and economic indicators expected Egypt's judiciary to be a
bastion of support for calls for structural legal reforms by the young
revolutionaries, establishing opposition groups and burgeoning new
political parties. 4 However, Egypt's judiciary proved to be more coopted
than anticipated as it issued mass death sentences against thousands of
alleged Muslim Brotherhood members, 5 life sentences to youth that lead
the January 2 5 th uprisings for violating a dubious anti-protest law,6 and
convictions of journalists on specious evidence.7 Judicial legitimacy,
thus, hangs in the balance.
This Article explores why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its
liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25t"
uprisings, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary
change. Scholars have depicted Egypt's judiciary as one of the few state
institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most

2. SAMER SOLIMAN, AUTUMN OF DICTATORSHIP 137 (Peter Daniel trans., Stanford
University Press 2011) (2006).
3.

See SIRt GLOPPEN ET AL., COURTS AND POWER IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA 25

(2010); Mahmoud Hamad, When the Gavel Speaks: Judicial Politics in Modem Egypt
266-67 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Utah) (on file
with author) (noting that most scholars agree that courts and judges in Egypt have been
instrumental in expanding rights and liberties).
4. Who's behind Egypt's Revolution?, THE NATION (Feb. 16, 2011),
http://www.thenation.com/slideshow/l 58642/slide-show-whos-behind-egyptsrevolution#; A Look at the Youth of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood,NPR (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/17/133777435/a-look-at-the-youth-of-egypts-muslimbrotherhood.
5. Abdel Ramadan, The Menace of Collective Punishment and Lack of Due
Diligence in Egypt, TAHRIR INST. FOR MIDDLE EAST POL'Y (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://timep.org/commentary/the-menace-of-collective-punishment-and-lack-of-duediligence-in-egypt/; Security vs. Justice: Mass convictions in Egypt underline judges'
2015),
8,
(Feb.
PRESS
ASSOCIATED
in punishing dissent,
power
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/02/08/security-vs-justice-mass-convictions-inegypt-underline-judges-power-in.
6. Ramadan, supra note 5; Security v. Justice, supra note 5; Aya Nader, The
'Executions Judge' Nagy Shehata, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/02/16/executions-judge-nagy-shehata/.
7. Nader, supra note 6.
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independent judiciaries in the Middle East.8 I challenge this position and
proffer that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts
for four reasons: 1) Mubarak's concerted efforts to quash judicial
independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the
loyalist judicial leadership who co-opted a critical mass of judges; 2) the
revolutionary youth and civil society's failure to appreciate the
judiciary's circumscribed defmition of judicial independence that did not
include judicial accountability to the citizenry; 3) judges' elite notions of
rule of law viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and
more specifically to the judiciary's institutional interests; and 4) internal
divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in
adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim
Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms
of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo.
As a result, judges internalized the polarized political disputes between
the secular, military-security camp and the Islamist camp. Judges
became more concerned with retaliating against Morsi and his loyalists
than upholding liberal principles of separation of power and individual
rights. In sum, endogenous politicization of judges, as opposed to
exogenous threats to judicial independence, has become the primary
threat to rule of law in Egypt.
Although the judiciary had long advocated for reforms to the
Judicial Authority Law to remove formal executive controls over judicial
affairs, their motive lied more in their desire for complete judicial
autonomy from the executive rather than improving judicial governance
through accountability measures. In contrast, the secular youth activists
and Muslim Brotherhood called for judicial accountability as a
prerequisite for legal reform in order to prevent the judiciary from
cooptation by the executive branch. These populist calls for judicial
accountability within broader campaigns for transitional justice

8. Moustafa, Principles,supra note 1, at 91, 94; Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the
State: The Judicializationof Politics in Egypt, 28 J. LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 883, 885 (2003)

[hereinafter Law Versus the State]; see Nathan J. Brown, Reining in the Executive: What
Can the Judiciary Do?, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT 133, 141 (2008)
(discussing the impact of the independent nature of the courts in Egypt); STEVEN A.
COOK, RULING BUT NOT GOVERNING: THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN

EGYPT, ALGERIA, AND TURKEY 65 (2007); see generally Clark B. Lombardi, The

Constitution as Agreement to Agree: The Social and PoliticalFoundations (andEffects)
of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF

CONSTITUTIONS 398 (Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 1st ed. 2013); CLARK B.
LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE INCORPORATION OF THE
SHARI'A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2006) [hereinafter LOMBARDI, STATE LAW
AS ISLAMIC LAW].
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threatened judges' preferences. 9 While self-preserving characteristics are
common among judges who often belong to the elite, in both democratic
and authoritarian regimes, a group of Egyptian reformist judges had
spearheaded efforts for judicial independence dating back to the 1970s at
great risk to their individual interests. 1 ° The Report of the Judicial
Conference of 1986, the Supreme Constitutional Court's rulings in the
1990s in favor of political and social rights, and the judicial
independence movement in 2005-2006 gave reformists reason to believe
the judiciary would be more supportive rather than obstructive of
revolutionary forces. However, the reformists' agendas, which included
merit-based hiring, transparency in judicial affairs, and de-politicizing
the judiciary, were met with resistance. Once the judges realized they
could not attain judicial independence without judicial accountability to
the people, they joined the military-security apparatus' campaign to
quash the secular youths' movement, buttressed by the Muslim
Brotherhood. Likewise, the judges concluded that Morsi's purported
judicial reforms were really an attempt to pack the courts with his
loyalists; thereby prompting judges to join other state institutions keen on
sabotaging the Morsi regime.
Accordingly, this Article begins with a summary of rule of law
literature to argue that the judiciary relied on thin notions of rule of law
to facilitate the criminalization of dissent, which was instrumental in the
military-security apparatus' defeat of revolutionary forces. Section II
explores the theories of judicial independence and rule of law with
respect to courts in authoritarian regimes to provide a theoretical
framework for analyzing the case of Egypt. Section III analyzes how the
Sadat and Mubarak regimes coopted the judiciary by manipulating
financial and political incentives to allow judges to meet their
preferences for job security for themselves and their male relatives,
income security, and high status in exchange for rulings favorable to the
executive. Starting with a brief historical summary, Section III examines
the endogenous and exogenous factors that placed the Egyptian judiciary
in a weak position with regard to challenging executive action. Over
three regimes, incentives caused many judges to betray the institution's
historical pursuit of serving as a check on authoritarianism and a refuge
9. David Mednicoff, Middle East Dilemmas, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
supra note 1, at 251, 264.
10. Carlos S. Nino, On the Exercise of JudicialReview in Argentina, in TRANSITION

ABROAD,

TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

309, 311 (hwin P.

Stotzky ed., 1993) (arguing that judicial review requires that "a small group of wise
people, who are neither directly involved in the democratic process nor directly
responsible to [the parties] whose interests are at stake"); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D.
Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciaries: Institutionalizing Judicial
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 977 (2002).
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for citizens seeking relief from government abuse. This is due in large
part to the executive manipulating internal divisions within the judiciary
to marginalize and vilify reformist judges as a threat to the state while
promoting loyalist judges as guardians of rule of law. In the postJanuary 25 h era, a critical mass of judges appears much less hesitant in
overtly allying with an authoritarian executive branch. Thus, President
Sisi had license to purge reformist judges who vocally denounced
Morsi's deposal on July 3, 2013, as a military coup. 1'
Section IV analyzes how presidents Sadat and Mubarak established
self-perpetuating incentive systems to impose individual and institutional
self-restraint. Formal mechanisms in the Judicial Authority Law 46 of
1972, for example, grant the Ministry of Justice and the President the
authority to influence high-level judicial appointments, transfers,
promotions, and lucrative secondments to state institutions. 12 Similarly,
informal patron-client relationships, nepotism, and social influence over
judicial elites discipline reformist judges who take too seriously the
judiciary's role as a check on the executive branch. Meanwhile, proregime judges are placed in key positions in the Ministry of Justice and
Judges Club and tasked with marginalizing reformist judges. The silent
majority of judges have not overtly supported reform efforts because no
judge sought the wrath of an executive branch that could transfer him to
a remote rural court house, reject his sons' applications to the judiciary,
or black list him from lucrative secondments. While the judges sought
relief from such executive intervention, they did not want to lose the
fringe benefits they had come to expect as an entitlement. As a result,
the judges' efforts to attain judicial independence merely sought to
transfer control of the distribution of incentives from the executive
branch to the judiciary without necessarily reforming the way in which
the judiciary is governed.
Finally, Section V focuses on the Morsi and Sisi eras to proffer that
the judicial elite actively retaliated against Islamists for seeking reforms
11. Adham Yousef, Pro-Morsi Judges' Verdict Postponed to 14 March, DAILY
NEws EGYPT (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/02/21/pro-morsijudges-verdict-postponed-14-march/; Salma Abdelaziz, Sarah Sirgany & Josh Levs,
'Mass Death Sentences' for 183 in Egypt, CNN (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/02/world/egypt-court/; Jason Hanna, Sarah Sirgany &
Holly Yan, Egypt: Ex-ruler Hosni Mubarak, Accused in Deaths of Hundreds, Clearedof
Charges, CNN (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/29/world/meast/egyptmubarak-trial/.
12. Carothers, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that the internal structure of appointments
and promotions can constrain judicial activism independent of regime interference); See
also, e.g., Ratna Rueban Balasubramaniam, Judicial Politics in AuthoritarianRegimes,
59 U. TORONTO L. J. 405, 408-09 (2009) (explaining the establishment of the Supreme
Constitutional Court to counteract interference with the judicial branch through these
mechanisms).
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that would not only produce judicial accountability, but would also open
up judicial posts to MB loyalists. Judges also retaliated against youth
activists for igniting the revolutionary movement that posed a threat to
judicial interests in the first place. After Morsi's regime was forcibly
replaced with a military-backed government in 2013, the judiciary was
passive at best or activist at worst in the face of the executive's
manipulation of law in its harsh crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood
and the youth revolutionaries. Moreover, Morsi's efforts to amend the
Judicial Authority Law (JAL) to make the judiciary less nepotistic, better
qualified, and ideologically diverse earned the judges' irenotwithstanding that the judiciary has long sought to amend the JAL to
eliminate the formal mechanisms that authorize executive interference.
The Article concludes by arguing that judicial reform and
democratization efforts in Egypt and the broader Middle East should
focus not only on removing exogenous controls that affect judicial
independence, but also should impose a level of judicial accountability to
the people that prevents judges from facilitating authoritarianism.
Three fundamental assumptions inform my analysis. First, I adopt 13a
legal realist approach that politics and law are not neatly separable.
Thus, law is affected by the political context, and is often a product of
it. 14 Second, a political transition is a prerequisite for transitional justice
that holds past regimes accountable and prevents a reversion to
authoritarianism. As I argued in a previous article, Egypt did not
experience a political transition in 2011, which is a prerequisite for
transitional justice. 15 Rather, the military came out from behind the veil
of ruling for the past 50 years to openly govern on February 11, 201-1.16
Third, Egypt has been experiencing a culture war over the past three
decades between Egypt's secular elite and the rural and urban poor who
Indeed, the Muslim
have become increasingly more religious.
Brotherhood tapped into Egyptians' religiosity to win a landslide victory
13. See BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 7881 (2004) (discussing the legal liberalist view of "law is politics"); see also Paul W.
Kahn, Independence and Responsibility in the Judicial Role, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 73, 84 (arguing that efforts to
implement judicial independence is not just a struggle between law and politics, but
rather a struggle in the creation of law itself).
14. See, e.g., Delwin A. Roy & William T. Irelan, Law and Economics in the
Evolution of Contemporary Egypt, 25 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 163, 166-67 (1989)
(discussing the passage of a law which "denied the rank of minister ... any person
having occupied a position of such rank before the Revolution" and "a law was passed
forbidding a government employee dismissed by order of the President from bringing an
action in the Council of State").
15. See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Bringing Down an Uprising: Egypt's Stillborn
Revolution, 30 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2014).

16.

COOK, supra note 8, at ix-xx.
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in the parliamentary elections of 2012. While a full exposition of these
cultural fault lines is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting
that the judiciary is not immune or separated from these societal tensions.
Indeed, most judges are from well-educated urban families that view a
civilian as opposed to an Islamist state as a sign of modernity and
progress. In Egypt's highly classist society, such views caused large
portions of the judiciary to distrust the Muslim Brotherhood as suspect
outsiders and consequently obstruct former president Morsi's Islamist
agenda.17
With a judiciary firmly on the side of a strong-arm former military
general as president and the streets no longer available for airing
grievances, citizens no longer have a forum for seeking relief from their
dire economic and political circumstances. President Sisi's claims that
Egypt respects rule of law, therefore, is increasingly falling on deaf ears.
1.

CONTESTATIONS OF RULE OF

LAW AFTER THE "JANUARY

2 5 TH

REVOLUTION"

In contrast to Libya or Iraq where dictators ruled with an iron fist in
flagrant disregard for the rule of law, Egypt's authoritarians manipulate
law and the courts to create a veneer of legitimacy. 18 Through highly
centralized rule, Egypt's president and elite coalition exercise control
over state organizations, including the judiciary.19
Mubarak
continuously interfered in governmental portfolios, violated the
autonomy of state institutions, and fortified his position in the political
system. 0 Parliament was merely a d6cor to mask the true authoritarian
face of the regime." l State institutions were weak, apolitical, and unable
to openly compete with each other or oppose the upper elites'
prerogatives. 12 Instead, public institutions served the interests of the
president even if it compromised the institution's mandate. And because
the ruling elite in control of state institutions derived their power from

17. Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 405 (noting
mutual suspicions between liberals and Islamists in society and among jurists).
18. Balasubramaniam, supra note 12, at 407-08 (noting that a regime's dismantling
a constitutional system of checks and balances risks the appearance of a lawless regime).
19. JOSHUA STACHER, ADAPTABLE AUTOCRATS: REGIME POWER IN EGYPT AND SYRIA
173 (2012).
20. Id. at 83; see Hamad, supra note 3, at 300-01.
21. Samer Shehata, Political da'wa: understanding the Muslim Brotherhood's
participationin semi-authoritarianelections, in ISLAMIST POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
MOVEMENTS AND CHANGE 120, 124 (Samer Shehata ed., 2012); see generally Mona ElGhobashy, The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution, in THE JOURNEY TO TAHIR 21

(Jeannie Sowers & Chris Toensing eds., 2012).
22. STACHER, supra note 19, at 35.
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the president, anyone who challenged his power was quickly eliminated
and replaced with a compliant member of the ranking elite.23
This section provides the theoretical backdrop that explains how
authoritarian regimes exploit thin notions of rule of law to judicialize
politics in favor of the executive's interest to remain in power. In doing
so, judges become co-opted into legitimizing the authoritarian state by
employing thin notions of rule of law. In the post-2011 era, diverging
notions of thin and thick rule of law produced dissension between myriad
stakeholders vying to reap the benefits of the revolution. The political
chaos that transpired enabled the judiciary to pursue its preferences by
assisting the old guard military-security apparatus to replace former
general Hosni Mubarak with another military general, Abdel Fattah Al
Sisi.
A.

Thin and Thick Rule ofLaw

Lawyers and international development practitioners invoke "rule of
24
law" so frequently that the term adds more confusion than clarity.
Beyond preventing anarchy and war, the objectives of rule of law are as
diverse as the stakeholders that invoke the term.25 Tyrants appropriate
rule of law to perpetuate authoritarian rule while civil society advocates
claim rule of law is the best means to end tyranny.2 6 The contradictions

23. Id. at 38, 173; see, e.g., Hamad, supra note 3, at 288 (discussing a case of a
judge being removed from the board of the Judge's Club for not complying with the
executive interests).
24. SARAH WOLFF, THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
INTERNAL SECURITY 179 (Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent & William E. Paterson eds.,
2012).
25. Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction andProvisional
Conclusion, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW 1, 1-3 (Randall Peerenboom ed.,
2004).
26. Id. at 1 (noting that social activists employ rule of law as "an expeditious means
toward a greater end - achieving their favored political agenda"). Rodan defines
authoritarianism as "characterized by a concentration of power and the obstruction of
serious political competition with, or scrutiny of, that power." Jothie Rajah, Punishing
Bodies, Securing the Nation: How Rule of Law Can Legitimate the UrbaneAuthoritarian
State, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 945, 949 (2011); Hilton L. Root & Karen May, Judicial
Systems and Economic Development, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 304, 329 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008)

(identifying two norms related to rule of law: "the powers that be shall rule by, and
themselves obey, enacted, general rules, and.., they shall change their policies by
changing those rules rather than by arbitrary deviations for or against particular persons"
and 2) "a core of individual human rights inherent in law itself, so that the rule of law
must include the protection of rights").
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are due in large part to the wide gulf in two dominant conceptions of rule
of law: thin and thick.27
Several mechanisms effectuate thin rule of law including "an
independent judiciary, open and fair hearings without bias, [and] review
of legislative and administrative officials and limitations on the
discretion ' 28 of government policy makers.29 By requiring that the
government operate in accordance with law as declared by judicial
decision in matters both of substance and procedure,3 ° the state and the
ruling elite are restrained from the arbitrary exercise of state power."
Open and fair hearings by unbiased judges, opportunities to review
legislative and administrative mandates, and limitations on the discretion
of police further constrain the state.32 This allows, at a minimum, some
degree of predictability and limitation on arbitrariness of government
action, which in turn provides some level of individual rights and
freedoms.33 There is, however, a tension between liberty and equality in
liberalism, which results in less attention being paid to the unjust or
immoral outcomes of state power exercised in law's name.34 For
instance, legal regimes that perpetuated slavery, colonial repression, or
apartheid were not deemed an affront to rule of law at the time.35
Thin rule of law privileges formal procedural processes over
substantive communitarian rights or moral outcomes, 36 causing
27.

Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 2-5; Pilar Domingo et al., Conclusion to RULE OF
142, 14748 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001).
28. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 93.
29. See Luis Salas, From Law andDevelopment to Rule of Law: New and Old Issues
in Justice Reform in Latin America, in RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 27, at
24.
30. Laurent Pech, Rule of Law in France, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW,
supra note 25, 79, ("[Tlhe rule of law should provide in matters both of substance...
and of procedure.").
31. Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 37 ("[T]hin rule of law entails limits on the state
and the ruling elite."); Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of Rule of Law, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 9, at 31, 59; Salas, supra note 29.
32. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 93.
33. Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 6.
34. Balasubramaniam, supra note 12, at 412-13 (noting that this view is rooted in
legal positivism which views law, and accordingly rule of law, as amoral concepts);
TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 75 (arguing that liberalism is rule by and in the interests of
the economic elite while claiming to be neutral). Notably, most rule of law promotion
programs claim to be neutral insofar as focusing on procedural mechanisms, but in
practice rely on liberal democrat and capitalist values. Carothers, supra note 1, at 18-19;
Perenboom, supra note 25, at 36 (arguing that liberalism is founded on the liberty to
pursue one's own vision of the good life); Pech, supra note 30, at 79 ("[T]he rule of law
should provide in matters both of substance... and of procedure.").
35. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 95, 120; Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 37.
36. Pech, supra note 30, at 79; see Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 3 (thin rule of law
places a greater emphasis on ensuring stability). See generally Mara Revkin, Triadic
LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM
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authoritarian regimes to base their legitimacy on formal and procedural
regularities of law while disregarding the substantive adverse effects on
political and social rights. 37 Authoritarians find public support for their
policies and practices by claiming that so long as they obey the law (no
matter how oppressive or immoral the law may be), their regime is
founded on "rule of law.",38 Substantive political and social rights, thus,
39
can be abrogated if correct legal procedures are followed. In the end,
thin rule of law permits democrats or tyrants to reject calls for
distributive equality that promotes a more equal distribution of social
goods across groups or communities and still proclaim to be in
compliance with rule of law.4 °
In contrast, thick rule of law goes beyond incorporating formal
legality to call for social rights,4 1 substantive equality, and political
morality. Thick rule of law adopts the formal components of thin rule of
law but adds political morality to economic arrangements, forms of
42 It challenges formal
government, and conceptions of human rights.
legality by demanding more than merely the government enacting and
abiding by laws constructed of rules. Instead, the focus is on concepts of
justice rooted in community norms and values. Because rule of law is
adopted for the purpose of restraining the government in order to protect
substantive natural rights, shared customs, morality, and the good of the
community, 43 the government's responsibility is to make life better for its
citizens and engage in distributive justice."a

LegaL Pluralism in North Sinai: A case Study of State, Shari'a, and 'Urf Courts in
Conflict and Cooperation, 13 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 21 (2014) (discussing legal
pluralism in the Sinai and the consequent rise of local customary courts).
37. See Rajah, supra note 26, at 948.
38. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 96. This is particularly important for securely
entrenched authoritarians with long time horizons as they seek to expand their tax base
through economic activity. To do so, they attract foreign investors who seek out signals
of stability, which includes narrowly defined notions of rule of law focused primarily on
protecting property rights. See Hannah Franzki & Maria Carolina Olarte, Understanding
the political economy of transitional justice: A critical theory perspective, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE THEORIES 201, 215 (Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma

Beck, Christian Braun, & Friederike Mieth eds., 2014) (describing the use of rule of law
to attract foreign investments); Moustafa, Law Versus the State, supra note 8, at 883, 887.
39. Compare Kleinfeld, supra note 32, at 37, with TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 7273 (distinguishing between the rights and rule-book rule of law conceptions wherein the
former does not distinguish between rule of law and substantive justice).
40. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 120; Mohsen Al Attar, Counter-revolution by
Ideology? Law and development's vision(s) for post-revolutionary Egypt, 33 THIRD
WORLD Q., 1611, 1627 (2012); Balasubramaniam, supra note 12, at 412.
41. TAMANAHA, supranote 13, at 113.
42. Peerenboom, supranote 25, at 4.
43. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 96, 112-13 (noting that "freedom of expression is
meaningless to an illiterate; the right to vote may be perverted into an instrument of
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The theoretical debates surrounding thin and thick rule of law bring
to light the diversity in institutions, rules, and practices that may be
compatible with rule of law while producing myriad political outcomes.45
Comparative law scholars raise valid questions as to what values the
citizenry must possess to transform rule of law from an abstract ideal into
practice, and to what extent such values are found only in Western
liberalism. 46 These issues, among many others, defie the role of law in
society and its relationship with politics. For societies experiencing
political transitions, or on the cusp thereof, the role of law determines the
type and extent to which a transition is likely to occur.
While a full accounting of the complex role of law in Egypt's failed
transition is beyond the scope of this Article, one thing is clear: each
stakeholder regarded an independent judiciary as a prerequisite for
establishing rule of law. But similar to rule of law, judicial independence
is a contested concept both in the democratic and authoritarian context.
Notwithstanding the lofty rhetoric in support of an independent judiciary
in Egypt, the party in power actively sought to co-opt judges to further a
particular political agenda. 47 The next section explores this issue to
proffer that both the clashing notions of rule of law between the young
revolutionaries and the judiciary and the sustained subordination of law
to authoritarian politics stymied populist judicial reform efforts that
sought judicial accountability.
B.

Rule of Law and Judicializationof Politics in Egypt

In arguing that Egypt's judiciary sought independence without
accountability, this Article interrogates why an authoritarian regime
allows an independent judiciary to function in the first place.48 While
tyranny exercised by demagogues over an unenlightened electorate; freedom from
government interference must not spell freedom to starve for the poor and destitute").
44. See id. at 96; see also Meryl Chertoff & Michael Green, Revitalizing the Rule of
Law: Examining the Success of the Arab Spring, 34 HARV.INT'L REV. 2, 59 (2012).
45. Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 14; Christopher Larkins, Judicial Independence
and Democratization:A Theoretical and ConceptualAnalysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L., 605,
608 (1998).
46. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 3-4, 7-8.
47. Carothers, supra note 1, at 264-65; NATHAN J. BROWN, EGYPT'S JUDGES IN A
REVOLUTIONARY AGE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE 1 (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://camegieendowment.org/files/egyptjudiciary.pdf
[hereinafter
BROWN,
REVOLUTIONARY]; Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 38.
48. See Balasubramaniam, supra note 12, at 405 (suggesting authoritarian regimes
tolerate indepenent judiciary only to the limited extent necessary to maintain legitimacy);
Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE

WORLD 8-10 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001) (explaining that liberal

authoritarian regimes may be willing to a judiciary enough independence to decide legal
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this is not the question this Article aims to answer, it is an integral
component in determining how the Egyptian judiciary responded to the
transitional period after January 25,2011.
By judicializing politics, authoritarian regimes use courts to lend the
regime a veneer of legitimacy. 49 The judicialization of politics is "the
degree to which regime legitimacy is increasingly constructed upon the
public perception of the state's capacity and credibility in terms of
50 The more a regime
delivering on rule of law and rights protection."
experiences a political crisis, the more it leans on judicializing politics to
bolster its legitimacy."1 Likewise, political opposition use judicial bodies
to challenge adverse government decisions, publicize domestically and
internationally the regime's malfeasance and human rights violations,
52
The courts,
and protect their members from coercive state practices.
thus, become the forum where political conflicts are fought.
Persuading the citizenry that the judiciary is in fact independent
strengthens the government's political legitimacy as well as the
5 3 As
international community's interest in investing in the economy.
citizens demand that courts be impartial, regardless of how impractical
that may be, authoritarians become savvy in giving the judiciary just
enough leeway to counter allegations of tyranny but not enough to

obligations of private citizens but not independent enough to decide the legal obligations
of the regime) ; see Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree ofIndependence, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 57 (discussing the tension between
judicial independence and sovereignty). But see Hamad, supra note 3, at 15-17 (arguing
that democracy is ordinarily a precondition to an independent judiciary and that
authoritarian regimes will only tolerate an independent judiciary upon losing power).
49. Shapiro identifies five possible reasons that authoritarian regimes use courts: "1)
establish social control and sideline political opponents, 2) bolster a regime's claim to
"legal" legitimacy, 3) strengthen administrative compliance within the state's own
bureaucratic machinery and solve coordination problems among competing factions
within the regime, 4) facilitate trade and investment; and 5) implement controversial
policies so as to allow political distance from core elements of the regime." Tamir
Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction to RULE BY LAW, supra note 26, at 4
[hereinafter Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction].
50. Hamad, supra note 4, at 26 (quoting Pilar Domingo, Judicializationof Politics:
The Changing Political Role of the Judiciary in Mexico, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF
POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 22 (Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden, & Alan Angell, eds., 2d
ed. 2005)).
51. Hamad, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that judicialization of politics occurs in both
democratic and authoritarian states).
52. HOLGER ALBRECHT, RAGING AGAINST THE MACHINE: POLITICAL OPPOSITION
UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM IN EGYPT 33 (2013).
53. See Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The
Judicializationof Politics in Egypt, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 26, at 132 [hereinafter
Moustafa, Resistance]; Hamad, supranote 3, at 19.
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jeopardize the regime's centralized grip on power.5 4 The executive takes
great interest in dominating the judiciary in ways that produce rulings
that do not threaten the regime's core interests while still appearing
independent in the eyes of the people. This places courts in the "dialectic
of empowerment" whereby the regime simultaneaously seeks both to
benefit from judicial empowerment and to constrain the courts to
minimize the costs of judicial autonomy through rulings that limit the
regime's power." Courts, however, must restrain their rulings to avoid
losing jurisdiction to special courts that issue rubber stamp decisions in
favor of the executive.56 Over time, the judicialization of politics permits
the authoritarian regime to offset its lack of electoral legitimacy by
appearing to bow to court rulings.57
Multiple theories attempt to explain why authoritarians grant
judiciaries some independence. The power preservation thesis argues
that when they face probable replacement and their time horizon in
power is short, authoritarian rulers establish independent judicial
institutions to serve as watch dogs that prevent the emergence of power
centers outside the regime's control. 58 The federal government structure
thesis posits that if a democratization process takes root during a
transitional process, the authoritarian regime is incentivized to create
independent judiciaries to mediate conflicts between sub-national groups
and the state to monitor powerful state institutions such as the central
54. Balasubramaniam, supra note 12, at 405, 414-15; Root & May, supra note 26, at
319-20 (arguing that courts in authoritarian regimes that subscribe to thin rule of law
enjoy some space to introduce marginal protections for rights).
55. Balasubramaniam, supra note 12, at 406.
56. Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 50, at 18 (arguing that Egypt's
"Supreme Constitutional Court was able to push a liberal agenda and maintain its
institutional autonomy from the executive largely because the regime was confident that
it ultimately retained full control over its political opponents").
57. Hamad, supra note 3, at 27; Moustafa, Law Versus the State, supra note 8, at
927-928.
58. Hamad, supra note 3, at 17. INT'L BAR ASS'N HUMAN RIGHTS INST., SEPARATING
LAW AND POLITICS: CHALLENGES TO INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN

EGYPT 29 (2014) ("The decision was taken after the judges had publicly criticised
irregularities in the parliamentary elections of 2005 and suggested that an inquiry should
be held into alleged electoral fraud in which a number of judges close to the government
were allegedly complicit.") [hereinafter IBAHRI]. See also Bjorn Bentlage, Strife for
Independence in an Autocratic Regime: The Egyptian Judges' Club 2000-2007, 50 Die
Welt des Islams 243, 265-66 (2010) ("At that time, election results in several districts
had been declared invalid by court decisions. Although the rulings were not implemented
by parliament, the evaluations by the Judges' Club threatened to further undermine the
legitimacy of the government. As with previous reports by the Club's committees, details
had been leaked to the press, this time including the names ofjudges who were suspected
to have participated in electoral fraud. Based on these leaks to the press, the Supreme
Council referred several prominent judges in February and March 2006, including the
Club's secretary general, to interrogation on the charges of engaging in politics and
harming the dignity of the judiciary.").
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59
bureaucracy, intelligence apparatus, policy, and army. Neither of these
theories apply to Egypt, however, because Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak
all had long-time horizons of power and a democratization process never
took root in Egypt after January 25, 2011.60
Tamir Moustafa's work on the Egyptian judiciary proffers that,
under the credible commitment thesis, authoritarian regimes with longer
time horizons (like the Nasser, Mubarak, and Sadat regimes) are more
likely to provide the judiciary some independence to provide assurances
to much needed domestic and international investments. Moustafa
argues that the Sadat and Mubarak regime were compelled to allow more
political liberalization, including rule of law and limited judicial
independence, as a source of legitimacy to offset their regime's failure to
sustain the high levels of public benefits provided by the Nasser
regime. 61 To survive economically, the state had no choice but to
substitute political rights for welfare rights due to its inability to provide
6
employment, health service, and food subsidies. ' The regime used
judicial mechanisms to absorb the public's anger over increasing
political corruption from the ruling elite.63 By having courts issue
rulings striking down certain laws as a means to privatize the economy
and shrink subsidies, the executive redirected the public's anger toward
the judiciary. As more judges were motivated by both self preservation
and a conviction to do the government's political bidding, the judiciary
itself became politicized. 64 The result is the judicialization of politics.
Mahmoud Hamad identifies four conditions that incentivize long
term authoritarians to preserve some judicial independence: 1) lack of
traditional legitimacy or charismatic sources of legitimacy; 2) inability to
provide welfare goods such as economic and social services that have
been provided in the past; 3) a weak international or regional role; and 4)
popular support of the judiciary based on perceptions of judges as
65
The
professionals, independent, and concerned political actors.
absence of these conditions under Mubarak compelled his regime to
allow for some restrained judicial independence. For instance, Mubarak

59.

Hamad, supra note 3, at 17-18.

60.

See generally Aziz, supra note 15.

61. Tamir Moustafa, Law in the Egyptian Revolt, 3 MIDDLE EAST L. & GOVERNANCE
181, 184 (2011) [hereinafter Moustafa, Revolt] ("Finally, the regime pushed through
controversial amendments to the Constitution in 2005 and 2007 that entrenched illiberal
measures into the Constitution itself, thus placing them beyond the scope of judicial
review.").
62. Hamad, supra note 3, at 29.
63. Nabil Abdel Fattah, The PoliticalRole of the Egyptian Judiciary, in JUDGES AND
POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, supra note 8, at 71, 86.
64. Brown, Reining in the Executive, supra note 8, at 149.
65. Hamad, supra note 3, at 31.
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was notoriously uncharismatic and his incremental removal of subsidies
due to pressures by international lenders incentivized him to judicialize
politics by shifting some of the political backlash onto a quasiindependent judiciary.
When the judiciary leveraged its limited
independence to issue rulings that preserved civil liberties and the
electoral process, popular support for the judiciary arose. This made it
more costly for Mubarak to overtly eliminate judges' independence.66
As discussed in more detail in Section IV, the judicialization of
politics under both Sadat and Mubarak created the veneer of judicial
independence despite the regimes' deployment of formal and informal
mechanisms that incentivized judges to self-restrain their powers to
preserve their financial and individual interests.6 7 In other words, the
executive established an unspoken rule wherein the judicial leadership
does not contest executive interference in politically sensitive cases in
exchange for fringe benefits, unchecked nepotism, and minimal
accountability to the public.
The courts are left with the unsavory choice of rejecting this
arrangement at the risk of becoming more controlled by the executive or
accepting the deal and compromising independence. In the end, courts
had to placate the regime just enough to avoid full cooptation while still
retaining their perceived public legitimacy. 68 When courts did not
accommodate regime mandates and could not expeditiously and
surreptitiously be co-opted, the regime created special courts to channel
political cases it deemed essential to its survival. In contrast, political
cases remained in the regular judiciary when judges show deference to
the regime. This placed the judiciary in another bind wherein they must
decide whether to defer to the regime to retain their jurisdiction or to
challenge unlawful regime action and face future limits on their judicial
review powers.6 9
While expounding a new theory to explain why the executive
granted the judiciary some independence is beyond the scope of this
Article, I argue that the credible commitment theory falls short in
explaining the events that have unfolded since the January 25th uprising.
Specifically, the theory does not address the internal divisions among the
judges and endogenous factors that cause judges to resist judicial
66. Notably, the judiciary's focus on expanding its independence was shaped in
large part by its tug of war with the executive, and thus did not include accountability to
the people. As such, the literature narrowly focuses on the relationship between the
executive branch and the judiciary-a gap this Article aims to fill.
67. GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 24.
68. Martin Shapiro, Courts in AuthoritarianRegimes, in RULE BY LAW, supra note
26, at 326, 334.
69. Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction,supra note 50, at 4, 12; ALBRECHT, RAGING
AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 52, at 7.

2016]

INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY

accountability to the people. Existing scholarship does not adequately
address the dynamics that occur during transitional periods when the
institutional identity of the Egyptian judiciary appears to be shifting
away from liberal understandings of civil liberties and horizontal
accountability of the executive toward thinner conceptions of rule of law
antagonistic to populist democracy that privileges stability over
substantive political and social rights. 70 As a result, Interim President
Adly Mansour and President Sisi permitted politically sensitive cases to
be tried within the ordinary judiciary because the judges' interests are
more aligned with the military elite who currently control Egypt post71
As
January 25th than the populist youth and Islamist opposition.
discussed in Section III and IV, the internal cultural and institutional
identity shifts that have occurred within the judiciary since 2000 may be
a greater threat to judicial independence than exogenous factors used to
co-opt individual judges' preferences.
The next section interrogates the contested concept of judicial
independence to set the stage for Section III and IV's in-depth analysis
addressing why the Egyptian judiciary was unable and unwilling to
support the revolutionary demands for (thick) rule of law that would
have granted judges more independence in exchange for judicial
accountability to the people.
II.

THEORIZING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Through judicial review, courts serve the political accountability
function of enabling popular contestation over political control by
protecting the spaces where political deliberation and social mobilization

70. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 973 (noting that judges are
people too and thus their independence from oversight by voters may cause them to
misapply the law for their own inappropriate reasons).
71. Egypt Muslim Brotherhood verdicts 'blatantly unjust': Human Rights Watch,
REUTERS, Apr. 12, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/12/us-egypt-courtbrotherhood-idUSKBNON30RF20150412 ("An Egyptian court's decision to sentence 14
men to death and jail 37 others accused of ties to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood was
"politically motivated" and "blatantly unjust", Human Rights Watch (HRW) said on
Sunday."); Gloria Galloway, Trial of Journalists in Egypt Uncorroboratedby Evidence
7:36 PM),
16 , 2014,
Says Judge, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Apr.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/family-of-imprisoned-joumalist-hopesbaird-will-intervene/article18047758/ ("Mohamed Fahmy, the English-language bureau
chief in Cairo for the Qatar-based Al Jazeera television network, was arrested with two of
his colleagues-Australian reporter Peter Greste and Egyptian producer Baher
Mohamed-on Dec. 29. The men are being tried along with 17 others on charges of
conspiring with the banned Muslim Brotherhood to tarnish Egypt's international
reputation.").
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Court rulings distinguish state sovereignty from the holders of
governmental power, thereby empowering the people to protect their
73
rights from an over-reaching state or the tyranny of the majority.
Consequently, independent judiciaries make possible the delegitimation
of a government by facilitating the existence of competing
representatives of the state.
While offering multiple benefits to democracy, an independent
judiciary also poses risks. By placing a check on the executive and
legislative branches, judicial review risks replacing rule of law with rule
by judges.74 Judges with the final say over the interpretation and
application of laws promulgated by elected officials wield significant
power to determine the implications of the rules.75 And if those judges
are members of the elite with minimal connections or accountability to
the public, the judiciary becomes counter to majoritarian principles that
undergird liberal democratic norms.7 6
In countries experiencing
transitions from authoritarian rule-as Egypt did albeit briefly-the rule
of the few (including the judges) has impeded rule of law for the many. 77
Moreover, when boundaries between the branches of government are
thin or nonexistent while the powers of presidents are broad, 78 courts
struggle to shield themselves from undue interference, especially when
court rulings hinder the executive's ability to remain in power
79
indefinitely.
In measuring a particular nation's judicial independence, at least the
following two threshold questions come to the forefront. First, how
much independence is necessary while still preserving accountability to
72.

GLOPPEN,

supra note 3, at 19.

73. See Kleinfeld, supra note 32, at 59; Kahn, supra note 13, at 77 (noting that by
taking jurisdiction, the courts dislocate the government's claim to represent the state and
denies the government its privileged place as it becomes one of two parties before the
court).
74. See GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 124.
75. See TAMANAHA, supranote 13, at 90.
76. See GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 166-67; see also Marcela Rodriguez, Some
Thoughts on Institutional Structures in the Judicial Process, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 166-67; Peerenboom, supra note 25, at
35-36 (noting that conservative judiciaries may aggravate inequities by siding with the
powerful entrenched interests). However, empirical studies of the U.S. Supreme Court
show it serves more as a pro-majoritarian institution in large part because the judges are
selected through a political process that requires the executive's nomination and the
Senate's confirmation. GLOPPEN, suprasupra note 3, at 27; See also Nuno Garoupa &
Tom Ginsburg, The ComparativeLaw and Economics ofJudicialCouncils, 27 BERKELEY
J. INT'L LAW 53, 56-57 (2009).
77. Ash U. Bali, The Perils ofJudicialIndependence: ConstitutionalTransition and
the Turkish Example, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 235, 238 (2012); TAMANAHA, supranote 13, at at
74; see generally Aziz, supra note 15.
78. GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 21.
79. Id.
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the people? And second, from what or whom should the judiciary be
independent? 80 A review of the theories set forth by four leading
scholars focused on the institutional design of judiciaries shed light on
these questions addressed in the Egyptian context in Section InI. 81 That
is, how does the executive branch employ exogenous and endogenous
factors to co-opt Egypt's judges such that the judiciary is less
independent than the regime purports?
Owen Fiss identifies three factors that contribute to judicial
independence-party detachment, political insularity, and individual
autonomy. 82 First, party detachment requires that judges be independent
from parties who appear before them in court. 83 Without this, a judge
cannot be impartial with respect to the interests of all parties in a legal
dispute.84 Second, political insularity requires that the judiciary be free
from the influence or control of other government institutions.85
Although the courts are part of the state, they should be independent of
other governmental institutions, and thus serve "as a countervailing force
within the larger government system." 86 Notably, political insularity
may still privilege the judiciary over the executive and legislature such
that judges' authoritative positions on questions of principle may be
incorrect or frustrate the will of the people, even if politically neutral.87
Third, individual autonomy entails a judge's ability to adjudicate without

80. Jorge Correa Sutil, The Judiciary and the Political System in Chile: The
Dilemmas of JudicialIndependence During the Transitionto Democracy, in TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 101.
81. GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 25 (noting that most of the literature on judicial
reform focus on institutional design and the structural protections necessary for ensuring
the accountability function of the courts).
82. Fiss, supra note 48, at 55-56. In the Canadian context, Martin Friedland lists
four categories that promote judicial independence. The first involves structural
protections that shield the court from physical harm, political interference, contempt of
court, immunity from civil and criminal process, and arbitrary removal of jurisdiction.
The second category affects security of tenure such as rules setting retirement age,
supernumerary status, and incapacity. The last two categories affect financial security in
the form of pay and pension and disciplinary rules that ensure punishment for
professional or personal misbehavior is not arbitrary, capricious, or politicized based on
the regime's interests in restraining the judiciary. See generally MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND,
A PLACE APART: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CANADA (Ottawa:
Canadian Judicial Council 1995) (identifying aspects of systems that promote judicial
independence); Hamad, supra note 4, at 13-14.
83. Fiss, supra note 48, at 55-56 (noting that even a cultural tie could cause a judge
to identify with one party more than the other, resulting in a transgression).
84. Hamad, supra note 3, at 11.
85. Fiss, supra note 48, at 55-56; Hamad, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that political
insularity is particularly relevant for administrative courts).
86. Fiss, supra note 48, at 56.
87. Id. at 58.
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pressure from peers or senior judges to issue a decision against the
findings of the presiding judge.88
Building off of Fiss, Donald Jackson proposes six overlapping
factors that affect judicial independence: 1) the method of selection; 2)
tenure of office; 3) removal for official misconduct; 4) adequate
resources; 5) institutional rules that protect individual judge's decisions;
and 6) a legal and political culture supportive of rule of law. 89 He argues
that judicial autonomy is maximized when judicial recruitment is
controlled from within the judiciary based on education and expertise of
the applicants. 90 Likewise, lifetime tenure or pre-established long-term
appointments coupled with legal safeguards against retaliatory removal
preserve judicial independence. 91 While removal for official misconduct
is essential for addressing corruption and incompetence, it should be
conducted transparently and administered by professional peer judges.92
Adequate facilities, staff, and other resources minimize judges'
vulnerability to bribery, and allow courts to operate efficiently. 93 The
integrity of individual and collective judges' decisions must also be
protected by prohibiting prior review of judicial decisions before verdicts
are issued. 94 Finally, a legal and political culture among95judges and
government officials that adheres to these rules is necessary.
Often times, the dominant conceptions of judicial independence are
taken from Western liberal democracies with a culture, history, and
institutional framework that minimize the adverse externalities arising
from independent judiciaries. 96 In authoritarian regimes, however,
88. Id. at 55; GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 11-12.
89. Donald W Jackson, Judicial Independence in Cross-National Perspective, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: ESSAYS, BIBLIOGRAPHY, AND DISCUSSION GUIDE 10 (American
Bar Association ed. 1999).
90. But see Rodriguez, supra note 76, at 165 (arguing that judges can never be
impartial or neutral because they belong to a particular class, gender, race, religion,
ideology, and social position).
91. But see Nuno Garoupa, Marian Gili & Fernando G6mez-Pomar, Political
Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the
Spanish Supreme Court, 9 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript
at 11), http://dx.doi.org/l0.2139/ssrn.1877083, (noting that non-lifetime tenure can lead
judges to rule in ways that promote their self-interest in obtaining employment after their
term ends).
92. See, e.g., Donald P. Kommers, Autonomy versus Accountability: The German
Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 48, at 137,

148.
93. Hamad, supra note 3, at 14.
94. Id.
95. Hamad, supra note 3, at 13-14.
96. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 71-72. Most judicial models fall within
two categories: the career model or the recognition model. The career model is prevalent
in Europe and nations operating under civil code systems, resulting in judges hired upon
graduation from law school and serving as judges for their entire careers. The
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judges are predominantly from the political and economic elites whose
interests are intertwined with the regime and may exercise their judicial
independence in contravention to a democratic process, particularly if it
is populist. For example, granting significant powers to a politicized and
corrupt judiciary intimidated by external pressure, motivated by personal
or group agendas, or lacking expertise of law runs counter to democratic
objectives.97 Likewise, simply rewriting a country's laws based on
Western models is doomed to fail. 98
Sift Gloppen, thus, cautions that the context of a particular country
plays a key role in examining a judiciary's independence. 99 Greater
attention should be paid to the circumstances of a particular country's
local politics, culture, and the legal context to determine how superior
courts exercise judicial authority and accountability functions. °° For
instance, regime stability, a competitive political party system, horizontal
power distribution, and the degree of political freedom are all
preconditions for independent judicial behavior. 101 Similarly, impartial

recognition model prevails in the US and other common law systems wherein the
political system selects and approves judges through a process of nomination and
confirmation or elections. Kahn, supra note 13, at 84; see also Fiss, supra note 48, at 57.
97. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 110.
98. See Carothers, supranote 1, at 25.
99. GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 26. Siri Gloppen categorizes multiple factors into four
groupings. The first group focuses on structural independence from the political
branches including appointment procedures, disciplining judges, tenure protection,
salaries, and the judiciary's control over its budget. Financial need, for instance,
increases the judiciary's political vulnerability and susceptibility to being bribed in
exchange for favorable decisions by a particular party. Likewise, executive or
parliamentary control over judicial salaries may cause trenchant political responses to
objectionable judicial behavior thereby resulting in self-restraint by judges. The second
set of factors address institutional variables that affect the jurisdiction of the courts
including control of the courts over their caseload. The third group includes the
provisions of resources to courts including infrastructure, running costs, training, legal
materials and other factors that affect the judiciary's ability to process cases and deliver
judgments. The final grouping involves variables affecting the professional competence
of the judiciary such as recruitment patterns, education, training, and professional
standards. Id See also Bali, supra note 77, at 239 (noting that "a conception of judicial
independence that entails isolating the judiciary from the other branches of government
might be desirable where executives and legislatures are not themselves democratic"
whereas states in transition to democracy may be better off with a measure of
interdependency between the branches to ensure judicial accountability).
100. GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 153; Stephen Golub, A House without a Foundation,
in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 9, at 105, 113, 134 (noting that
constituencies and coalitions may be so fragmented and fractitious that the political
environment is inimical to judicial reform); Root & May, supra note 26, at 324
(recognizing that "imposing formal institutional structures on societies with incompatible
traditions is unlikely to succeed in bringing about lasting reform").
101. Hamad, supra note 3, at 15-16.
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judging relies on professional police work in gathering
evidence and
10 2
enforcement of decisions after courts issue rulings.
As discussed in more detail in Section IV, the Mubarak regime
employed various tactics that diminished the ordinary courts'
jurisdiction, increased the retirement age multiple times to reward senior
loyalist judges, offered lucrative secondments to loyalist judges, and
investigated reformist judges through a disciplinary process controlled by
the Ministry of Justice. 10 3 The executive also interfered with the hiring
of new judges, the disciplinary process, and secondments to both co-opt
individual judges and circumscribe judicial notions of rule of law as
primarily procedural, not substantive. Yet, Mubarak took great care not
to interfere directly with particular cases in the form of telephone
justice. 1°4 Instead, he relied on co-opted senior judges to serve as
internal watchdogs against judicial disobedience. 105
The next section delves into the Egyptian judiciary's protracted and
checkered struggle to attain independence from multiple regimes dating
back to the late 19th century. I argue that the Egyptian judiciary was
founded on liberal principles of judicial independence and separation of
powers that continue to influence contemporary judicial culture.
However, over time the executive branch's concerted efforts to co-opt
the judiciary eroded the judiciary's liberal underpinnings. As a result,
the young revolutionaries' faith in the judges was misplaced.

102. Root & May, supra note 26, at 304; Fiss, supra note 48, at 61-62.
103. See e.g., Law No. 183 of 1993 (Increasing Retirement Age from 60 to 64), alJardahal-Rasmiyah, 1993 (Egypt); Law No. 3 of 2002 (Increasing Retirement Age from
64 to 66), al-Jaridah al-RasmTyah, 2002 (Egypt); Law No. 159 of 2003 (Increasing
Retirement Age from 66 to 68), al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyah, 2003 (Egypt); Law No. 17 of
2007 (Increasing Retirement Age from 68 to 70), al-JarTdahal-RasmTyah, 2007 (Egypt).
104. Moustafa, Law Versus the State, supra note 8, at 927-28; Fattah, supra note 63,
at 275.
105. Hamad, supra note 3, at 262. ("Mubarak wanted to accomplish this goal without
forgoing his appeal to legality and the rule of law. Thus, instead of dismissing the Courts'
justices or amending the Courts' legislation to limit its jurisdiction or change its mandate,
as many authoritarian rulers would have done, Mubarak waited for the opportunity to
achieve his objectives without sacrificing the regime's appeal to legal legitimacy.
Mubarak had an ample opportunity when the SCC Chief Justice Wali al-Din Galal retired
in August 2001. During the liberal and active era of the SCC in the 1980s and 1990s, the
position of chief justice went to the most senior member of the Court, making it virtually
a self- perpetuating body. Unsurprisingly, that made possible a remarkable degree of
independence and consequently activism, especially during the era of' Awad al-Murr
(1991-1998). In order to rein in the Court, Mubarak used his appointment power to bring
in a series of chief justices who are closely aligned with the presidency.").
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CO-OPTED AND INDEPENDENT: THE HISTORY OF EGYPT'S
JUDICIARY

Notwithstanding interventionist policies of three consecutive
authoritarian regimes, the Egyptian judiciary was more independent than
During the contemporary
Nasser, Mubarak, and Sadat desired.
judiciary's formational period from 1883 to 1952, Egyptian judges
observed and eventually adopted a corporatist professional identity from
10 6
their European peers presiding over the Mixed Courts in Egypt.
Emboldened by the rise of the Egyptian nationalist movement that served
as a protective constituency advocating for an independent judiciary to
counterbalance the Crown and British occupation forces, the judiciary
established a distinctive identity rooted in liberal principles. 10 7 Even
under the most repressive conditions, this identity has survived among
parts of the judiciary such that no Egyptian president has yet been able to
completely dominate the institution. What has resulted, however, is an
ebb and flow of periods of relatively more or less independence from the
executive and little regard for judicial accountability to the people.
This section describes the various means of control exercised by the
Egyptian executive and how this ultimately produced an illiberal
judiciary willing to cooperate or look the other way in the military's
counter-revolutionary crackdown on Morsi supporters and youth
activists.10 8 Subsection A provides an overview of the foundational
period that established a culture of independence, a commitment to
liberalism, and a corporatist identity within the Egyptian judiciary. This
institutional identity, while diminished through executive incentives
among a majority of judges, has remained strong among some judges,
most of whom joined the judicial independence movement.10 9
Subsection B proceeds to summarize the trend toward judicial
independence stunted by the Nasser regime's perception of the judiciary
as an elitist institution that threatened his socialist agenda. Although
Nasser's commandeering was overt and sweeping, Sadat and Mubarak
were no less interested in controlling the judiciary. But due to their
106. Nathan J. Brown, The PrecariousLife and Slow Death of the Mixed Courts of
Egypt, 25 INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 31, 31-32 (1993) [hereinafter Brown, Precarious].
107. Mustapha Kamel A1-Sayyed, The Judicial Authority and Civil Society, in
JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, supra note 8, at 230; TARIQ AL-BISI{Ri, AL-

QADA AL-MISRI BAYNA AL-ISTIQLAL WA-AL-IHTIWA 150-60 (al-Qahirah, Maktabat alShuruq al-Dawliyah, 2006).
108. Tom Ginsburg, Courts and New Democracies: Recent Works, 37 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 720, 721-22 (2012); Yussef Auf, Prospectsfor JudicialReform, EGYPTSOURCE
(Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/prospects-for-judicialreform-in-egypt; see Hamad, supra note 3, at 251.
109. GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that the extent to which a culture of
legalism permeates society generally affects judicial behavior).
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inability to retain legitimacy through personal charisma or welfare
policies, Mubarak and Sadat were compelled to resort to indirect means
of influencing the judiciary to ensure judges could not threaten the
regime's core interests.
A.

The Roots of EgyptianJudicialIndependence

In the Middle East and North Africa region, Egypt's judiciary was
at the forefront of progression from informal adjudication processes,
based on customary and Islamic law undertaken by religious scholars, to
formal courts, presided over by university trained professional judges
applying codified law. The transition was driven in large part by French
and British occupation of Egypt in the 19th and 20 th centuries.1 0 As more
Europeans resided and conducted business in Egypt, they demanded
resolving their disputes before judges from their home countries who
would apply their laws. 1" In response to these demands, the Khedive
established the Mixed Courts in 1876.112 Beside European judges
presiding over cases were a select number of Egyptian judges who
applied British law to resolve disputes where one or more parties were
British citizens. 113 Through their interactions with European judges on
the Mixed Courts, Egyptian judges became exposed to the principles of
strict judicial independence and developed a sense of professionalism.
They also learned about the constitutional foundations of Western
liberalism and the preservation of civil liberties.
When the National Courts were created in 1883, the judges who
transferred from the Mixed Courts brought with them the values and
training they received from their European counterparts."' Moreover,
the judges in the National Courts were keenly aware of the institutional
110.

NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB

BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 156

(2002). For now

it is enough to note that from the beginning of constitution writing, textual silences and
vagueness were designed to undercut constitutionalism. Many of these techniques were
already developed before the imperial era, but British and French practice in Egypt, Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon developed them still further. As Elizabeth Thompson writes of the
imperial-era constitutions in Syria and Lebanon: "While assigning sovereignty to the
people, they also granted supreme power to a nonelected official who stood above the
law, the French high commissioner, who could decree laws, dismiss parliaments, and
even suspend the constitution itself." ELIZABETH THOMPSON, COLONIAL CITIZENS:
REPUBLICAN RIGHTS, PATERNAL PRIVILEGE, AND GENDER IN FRENCH SYRIA AND LEBANON

53 (2000).
111. Hamad, supra note 3, at 50.
112. Id. at 54; Brown, Precarious,supra note 106, at 33-52.
113. Brown, Precarious,supra note 107, at 34-37.
114. Hamad, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that by 1949 when the Mixed Courts were
closed, at least forty-nine Egyptian justices and judges were serving on the courts and
those who did not retire joined the ranks of the National Courts).
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independence enjoyed by the Mixed Courts and sought the 'same
privileges. To that end, Egyptian judges in the 1920s and 1930s
demanded that the courts' general assemblies, instead of the executive
branch, control the appointment of the presidents and deputy presidents
be immune from dismissal or arbitrary
of the courts and that all judges
15
age.'
retirement
the
to
changes
Benefitting from nationalistic aspirations prevalent in Egyptian
society at the time, the judiciary became a forum for challenging the
occupying British authorities.1 16 In an attempt to co-opt the judiciary
from the top, the executive branch provided special pay increases to
senior judges.117 The famous Egyptian nationalist, Sa'ad Zaghlool,
denounced these tactics in 1926 as a direct affront to judicial
independence and a form of official bribery in return for rulings
favorable to the government. 118 Despite such noble contestations,
supplementary pay and secondments became a normal part of judicial
compensation that continue until the present day to be a powerful tool in
the executive's strategy of co-optation.
From 1923 to 1952, when Egypt experienced a liberal era under the
1923 Constitution, the judiciary established legal precedents and
instituted a liberal legal tradition protective of citizens' rights and
liberties. 119 The creation of the Supreme Judicial Council pursuant to
Law Number 31 of 1936 and the passage of the Judicial Independence
Act in 1943 codified judicial independence rather than making it
dependent on the constitution, customs, or public opinion. 120 The
Judicial Independence Act also prohibited removal of a judge or justice
after he served three years.1 21 Judges who had not yet served for three

115.

Id. at 67; See generally NATHAN J.

WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF

BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB
(1997) (explaining the development of the

modem Egyptian legal system).
116. Hamad, supra note 3, at 75 (providing an example of when the National Courts
acquitted al-Wafd leaders in the assassination of the highest British general in the
Egyptian army).
117. Id. at 68. ("The awareness of the significance of judicial independence
manifested itself early on in the Chamber of Deputies' deliberations over the government
budget in 1926. One leading MP of al-Wafd Party criticized the government for raising
the salaries of three selected senior justices .... ").
118. Id. at 69 (quoting Sa'ad Zaghlool's famous speech on the floor of the parliament
in 1926).
119. Id. at 89-90; Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at
402.
120. Hamad, supra note 3, at 70-71.
121. Law No. 66 of 1943 (Law on the Independence of the Judiciary), al-Waqd 'i' alMilrTyah, 12 July 1943, art. 10 (Egypt); Hamad, supra note 3, at 71.
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years could not 122
be removed without the consent from the Supreme
Council.
Judicial
The establishment of the Council of State in 1946 was another
significant development in Egypt's judicial history.123 Modeled after its
French counterpart, the Council has the legal capacity to void executive
administrative decisions it finds in violation of legislative provisions or
to be an abuse of power.124 Its jurisdiction covers litigation and appeals
concerning provincial and municipal elections; salaries, pensions and
allowances due to public servants; disciplinary decisions against public
employees; and other administrative decisions. 125 The founding justices
of the Council were selected from among the most experienced and
respected judges, thereby establishing a strong collective culture of
independence that until the 2present
day sets the Council of State apart
6
1
judiciary.
ordinary
the
from
Prior to the 1952 Revolution, the British occupying forces, the
Crown, and the nationalist Al-Wafd party competed for power and
thereby placed the judges at the center of the nationalist movement.127
As the courts issued rulings in favor of Egyptian defendants that directly
challenged occupying British authorities, the judges earned popular
support that in turn enabled them to expand judicial independence. 128 By
the early 20th century, the Court of Cassation, Egypt's highest national
court, became "the guardian of civil and political rights."'129 Through its
rulings, the Court granted Egyptians the right to form political parties,
acquitted journalists on allegations of defaming the Crown, and
30
preserved the civil liberties of Egyptians.
Over time, the professional socialization of judges produced a
corporatist identity associated with independence and liberal values in
favor of civil liberties.13 ' To achieve institutional goals, the judges

122. Law on the Independence of the Judiciary, art. 11 (Egypt); Hamad, supra note 4,
at 71-72.
123. Law No. 112 of 1946 (Law on Establishing the State Council), al-Waqc'i' alMifrtyah, 1946 (Egypt).
124. Negad Mohamed EI-Borai, The Government's Non-execution of Judicial
Decisions,in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM INEGYPT, supra note 8, at 199-202.
125. Law on Establishing the State Council (Egypt).
126. Hamad, supra note 3, at 81 (noting that Dr. Muhammad Kamil Mursi and Dr.
Abd al-Razzaq Al-Sanhri were among Egypt's most sophisticated judges); Mahmud alKhudayari, The Law on Judicial Authority and JudicialIndependence, in JUDGES AND
POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, supra note 8, at 48.

127. Hamad, supra note 3, at 90.
128. Id. at 75.
129. Id. at 74, 230.
130. Id. at 74 (highlighting a case in 1922 of a journalist and his editor-in-chief who
were acquitted for defaming the Crown).
131. See generally BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 47.
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engaged in collective action tools, which remain a salient characteristic
Indeed, the sense of
of contemporary Egyptian judges. 3 2
the judiciary's tug of
explains
identity
corporatist
and
professionalism
co-opt them. The
to
seeking
war with multiple authoritarian regimes
checkered results of such disputes have led one leading scholar to
conclude that Egypt has "independent judges but no independent
judiciary."' 33 Many of the contemporary cooptation tactics can be traced
back to the Nasser era.
B.

Setting Precedents in Judicial Co-optation- The Nasser Era

In contrast to January 25, 2011, what transpired on July 23, 1952,
was nothing short of a revolution. Upon taking power, Gamal Abdel
Nasser swiftly implemented a socialist agenda that redistributed wealth
from the crony royal elites to the masses, increased access to education
134
His
for rural Egyptians, and expanded welfare programs to the poor.
nationalist agenda aimed to release Egypt from the grip of foreign
135 Nasser's regime
occupiers, and did so through coercive measures.
passed laws granting the executive branch sweeping powers over
political parties, the press, and civil liberties. 1 6 In the face of political
opposition, Nasser explicitly privileged military rule as the only
alternative to political disorder. 137 The social contract became the regime
providing economic and social welfare in exchange for popular support
38
of Nasser's socialist and nationalist policies. 1 That Nasser possessed
such extraordinary charisma to mobilize the masses made him less
dependent on political or legal-rational legitimacy to sustain public
support. 139 As a result, assaults on judicial independence produced
minimal political costs to his regime. Ultimately, Nasser's treatment of
the judiciary established an ominous precedent that empowered the

132. Hamad, supra note 3, at 58.
133. Holger Albrecht, How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism?Lessons from
Egypt, 12 DEMOCRATIZATION 378, 383 (2005) (quoting Nasser Amin).
134. Roy & Irelan, supra note 14, at 163-65.
135. See Roy & Irelan, supra note 14, at 164 (discussing state seizure of foreign
holdings).
136. Hamad, supra note 3, at 74 (noting that Law No. 179 of 1952 granted the
Ministry of Interior broad powers over the establishment, functions, and operation of
political parties).
137. AMOS PERLMUTrER, EGYPT, THE PRAETORIAN STATE 19 (1974); Hamad, supra
note 3, at 108 (noting that Nasser defined freedom based on macro and national level
interest, not at the individual level).
138. See Hamad, supra note 3, at 106.
139. See Hamad, supra note 3, at 92-93 (identifying three ways in which
authoritarians maintain legitimacy: personal charisma, welfare distribution, and legalrational).
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Sadat, Mubarak, and Sisi regimes to significantly constrain judicial
independence.
Soon after taking power, Nasser issued Law 353 of 1952 and Law
No. 165 of 1955, which transferred the powers of investigating judges to
the executive-controlled Public Prosecution Office and placed the
Council of State under the purview of the Council of Ministers. 140 The
Ministers controlled judicial appointments, promotions, and discipline of
judges in the Council. 41 After the judges expressed grave concerns with
these changes, the Council of Ministers issued a decree that removed the
most liberal members of the Council of State and replaced them with
judges who would not issue rulings that obstructed the regime's
agenda.142 By threatening the security of tenure through arbitrary
removal, the regime sent a clear warning to judges who took their
independence too seriously. This produced a conservative institution that
"favored governmental interests over citizens' or groups' rights and
liberties. 143 It was not until the1972 passage of Law No. 47, which
granted the Council of State judicial immunity and removed the Council
from under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, that the Council of
State began regaining its independence. 144
As judges in the civil courts refused to allow Nasser to unilaterally
impose his ideological agenda, he curtailed their jurisdiction. 145
Hundreds of laws were passed from 1952 to 1964 stripping courts of
jurisdiction over various administrative acts including petitions to annul
or suspend confiscation decrees, disputes related to ownership of
requisitioned properties, dismissals of civil servants without disciplinary
procedures, involuntary retirement of civil servants, university
administration decisions related to students, decisions by the Minister of
Interior to dismiss mayors and deputy-mayors, and presidential decrees
related to national security. 146 As the jurisdiction of the Office of Public
140. Hamad, supra note 3, at 114.
141. Hamad, supra note 3, at 117.
142. Law No. 165 of 1955 (Law on the Organization of the State Council), alWaqd'i' al-Mirdyah, 29 Mar. 1955 (Egypt); Hamad, supra note 3, at 117; but see
TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 90 (acknowledging that, due to the indeterminacy of law,
nothing prevents a judge from manipulating rules to achieve a pre-determined outcome).
143. Hamad, supra note 3, at 130.
144. Law No. 47 of 1972 (Law on the Council of State), al-Jarldahal-Rasmiyah, 5
Oct. 1972 (Egypt); Hamad, supra note 3, at 181 (noting removal of the provision in Law
No. 27 of 1967 that subjected the Council of State to oversight by the ministry ofjustice).
145. Hamad, supra note 3, at 118; see also Brown, Reining in the Executive, supra
note 8, at 137 (noting how an Egyptian executive's control over the legal framework may
allow manipulation of courts' jurisdiction).
146. See, e.g., Law No. 178 of 1952 (Law on Agricultural Reform) 9 Sept. 1952
(Egypt); Law No. 181 of 1952 (Law on the Dismissal of Staff Other Than the
Disciplinary Way), al-Waqj'i' al-Mi r7yah, 14 Sept. 1952 (Egypt); Law No. 31 of 1963
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Prosecution expanded, Nasser amended judicial authority laws to
strengthen the government's domination over the judicial members of the
Office. 147 Today, the Office of the Public Prosecution remains under the
control of executive authority notwithstanding amendments 1to
48 the JAL in
prosecutors.
to
autonomy
some
1984 and 2006 that returned
Nasser also fragmented the judiciary to weaken its ability to serve
as a check on executive power and preserve civil liberties. Exceptional
courts were created to quickly adjudicate political cases and issue the
rulings desired by the executive. 149 Moreover, any rulings issued by the
15 ° This practice
Court of Treason were prohibited from judicial review.
set the precedent for Mubarak's state security courts in effect throughout
his 30 year tenure. 151 Fragmenting the judiciary was a means for the
regime to control high profile cases through security courts while
independent. 15 2
claiming, albeit unconvincingly, that the judiciary was
Judicial fragmentation put the judges in a dilemma. On the one
hand, if they challenged the legality of the exceptional courts and their
loss of jurisdiction, they would invite Nasser to revamp the judiciary by
replacing the judges with regime loyalists. On the other hand, accepting
the fragmentation of the courts gave the executive little reason to
interfere in judicial affairs because the judges handled cases that were
not viewed as vital to the regime. 153 Indeed, when the courts became
more active in questioning the constitutionality of revolutionary
(Law amending Article 12 of Law No. 55 of 1959 Concerning Regulation of the State
Council), al-Jarldahal-RasmTyah, 11 Mar. 1963 (Egypt); Law No. 270 of 1956 (Law on
the Abolition of Martial Law), al-Waqd'i' al-Migriyah, 20 June 1956 (Egypt); Law No.
345 of 1956 (Law on the Organization of Egyptian Universities), al-Waqil'i' al-Migrtyah,
20 Sept. 1956 (Egypt); Law No. 106 of 1957 (Law on Mayors), al-Waqd'i' al-MifrTyah,
5 May 1957 (Egypt); and Law No. 119 of 1964 (Law on Special State Security
Measures), al-JarTdah al-RasmTyah, 24 March 1964 (Egypt).
147.

Abdallah Khalil, The General Prosecutor between the Judicial Executive

Authorities, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, supra note 8, at 59, 62 (citing

Law No. 56 of 1959 (Law on the Judiciary) 12 Feb. 1959 (Egypt) and Law No. 43 of
1965 (Law on the Judiciary) 22 July 1965 (Egypt)).
148. Id.
149. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyed, The Judicial Authority and Civil Society, in

JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, supra note 8, at 227, 229-30 (citing the Court

of the Revolution, the Court of Treason, state security courts, sequestration tribunals,
anti-feudalist tribunals, and trials of civilians before military courts among the various
exceptional courts created).
150. Hamad, supra note 3, at 124 ("Among the first legislation that denied the courts
any power over basic regime interests was "the Court of Treason Law," Law-decree
344/1952. This Law-decree sheltered verdicts issued by the Court of Treason from all
sorts of review or appeal.").
151. Hamad, supra note 3, at 124; Moustafa, Principles, supra note 1, at 96;
LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 8, at 143 (noting that state courts
heard political crimes and terrorism cases).
152. Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction,supra note 49, at 17.
153. Hamad, supra note 3, at 138.
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legislation and procedures after the military defeat in 1967, Nasser began
planning what became known as the 1969 Massacre of the Judiciary.154
Arguably the same dilemma exists today as Sisi permits the ordinary
courts to try politically sensitive cases. But in contrast to past regimes, I
argue that judges are issuing favorable rulings not to appease a coercive
executive but rather out of their individual convictions that Islamists and
youth revolutionaries are a threat to both judges' material interests and
the judiciary's institutional power.
The Judges Club is another product of the judiciary's formational
period. Established in 1939, the Judges Club has long been the vehicle
through which judges defend their institutional and personal interests.1 55
More than a social club, it runs a cooperative and savings fund for
judges, helps families of deceased judges, provides loans and low-cost
housing, and subsidizes transportation costs.' 56

The Judges Club also

controls which judges have access to scarce government resources,
including apartments in Cairo at discounted prices, villas on the
Mediterranean and Red Sea, subsidized car loans, and free medical care
in the United States or Europe for a judge and his family. 157 With over
90 percent of judicial personnel as members, the Judges Club is a
powerful institution capable of flexing its political muscle to fight for
judicial independence.1 58 Under the leadership of Mumtaz Nassar in the
1960s, for example, the Judges Club denounced the use of exceptional
courts that infringed on the ordinary courts' jurisdiction and rebuffed
Nasser's attempts to tighten the Ministry of Justice's control over
judges.1 59 In retaliation, Nasser engaged in a multi-year strategy to
weaken the Judges Club through divide and rule, draining the Club's
resources, and attempting to control the professional socialization of
judges. 60 Many of these same tactics were later adopted by Mubarak's

154. Hamad, supra note 3, at 139; Roy & Irelan, supranote 14, at 167.
155. See A-Sayyed, supranote 149, at 230.
156. Atef Shahat Said, The Role of the Judges' Club in Enhancing the Independence
of the Judiciary and Spurring Political Reform, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN

EGYPT, supra note 8, at 111, 112.
157. Golub, supra note 100, at 105, 120; see Bentlage, supra note 58, at 249 (noting
the legal status and functions of the Judges' Club).
158. Atef Shahat Said, supra note 157, at 113; Fattah, supra note 63, at 88.
159. Hamad, supra note 3, at 137 (rejecting Minister of Justice Fathi al-Sharqawi's
draft legislation in 1963 to tighten control of the Ministry of Justice's control over the
judiciary).
160. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyed, The Judicial Authority and Civil Society, in
JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, supra note 8, at 230 (describing Nasser's
efforts to persuade judges associations in the governorates to declare their independence
from the central Judges Clubs in Cairo and Alexandria).
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regime to weaken the judiciary in the decade preceding January 25,
2011.161
After the Judges Club successfully pushed for Law 43 in 1965 that
granted judges more autonomy, the regime pressured judges to join the
162 Nasser
Arab Socialist Union (ASU) party in order to remain a judge.
also sought to permit ASU officials to become judges without following
63
qualifications.1
the usual hiring procedures or possessing the proper
The Judges Club called foul, adopted a number of resolutions in March
of 1968 rejecting the proposals, and vocally denounced Nasser for
64 After the regime determined that
endangering judicial independence.'
the Judges Club was a center of dissident activity, the Ministry of Justice
publicly supported a list of regime-loyalists to run for the 15 member
defeated. 166
board elections on March 21, 1969.165 They were decisively
Intent on dominating the judges, Nasser issued five executive
decrees on August 31, 1969, that effectively crushed the judiciary's
167
Nasser dismissed 208
independence--both in fact and in spirit.
judges, most of whom were in leadership positions and at the helm of the
independence movement. 168 He dismissed the entire board of directors
of the Judges Club and abolished the .Supreme Council of Judges of the
Civil Judiciary. 169 In their place, Nasser appointed regime loyalists
170
He also
pursuant to the new authorities he had granted himself.
created the Supreme Council of Judicial Organizations-controlled by
the President and the Ministry of Justice instead of judges-and vested it
with the authority to determine judicial appointments, promotions,
transfers, and disciplinary actions. 171 To restrain a judiciary deemed too
161. Id.at 231-232.
162. Hamad, supra note 4, at 40.
163. Hamad, supra note 3, at 140; AI-Sayyed, supra note 147, at 230.
164. A1-Sayyed, supra note 149, at 230.
165. Hamad, supranote 3, at 141.
166. Hamad, supra note 3, at 141.
167. Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 406-07.
168. Roy & Irelan, supra note 14, at 168-69.
169. Roy & Irelan, supra note 14, at 168-69; see also Moustafa, Resistance, supra
note 53, at 134. President of the Republic of Egypt Decision No. 81 of 1969
(Establishing the Supreme Constitutional Court), al-Jaridahal-Rasmlyah, 1969 (Egypt);
President of the Republic of Egypt Decision No. 82 of 1969 (Instituting the Supreme
Council of Judicial Bodies), al-JarTdah al-Rasmyah, 1969 (Egypt); President of the
Republic of Egypt Decision No. 83 of 1969 (Reorganizing the Judicial Authorities), alJardahal-Rasm~yah, 1969 (Egypt); President of the Republic of Egypt Decision No. 84
of 1969 (Reorganizing the Administration of the Judges Club), al-Jarldahal-Rasmiyah,
1969 (Egypt).
170. Hamad, supra note 3, at 127.("Nasser and all presidents that succeeded him used
presidential appointment power to install loyal and politically trusted judges at the
pinnacle of all judicial institutions.").
171. Moustafa, Resistance, supra note 53, at 134; LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC
LAW, supra note 8, at 144.
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independent, Nasser established by legislation the Supreme Court and
granted it sole jurisdiction over the constitutionality of law. 17 2 The
regime did not conceal its motives when it stated that "[i]t has been clear
in many cases that the judgments of the judiciary are not able to join the
march of development which has occurred in social and economic
relations ..
173 By appointing judges to only three year terms, the
President could place the court under his tight control. And indeed, the
Supreme Court's over 300 rulings in its first 10 years did not hinder the
174
regime's agenda.
Although Sadat repealed many of Nasser's judicial decrees during
Sadat's first two years in office, this traumatic period in Egyptian judicial
history continues to haunt today's judiciary.175 In a telling statement,
reformist Judge Yahya al-Rifa'i writes, "We, judges, have nothing to do
with politics; we won't involve either ourselves or our club in its
struggle .... Reciprocally, politics has nothing to do with us either. As
a matter of fact, politics imposed itself on the club's affairs; and we all
176
remember the 1968 and 1969 events.',
Since then, Egypt's judges have been engaging in self-restraint from
fear of another judicial massacre that would not only destroy the
institution but would devastate judges' livelihoods.177 The silent
majority of judges who avoid direct confrontations with the executive
appreciate that the cost of vocal opposition is significantly higher than
silence. That is, some co-optation reaps a little independence.
IV. JUDICIAL COOPTATION UNDER SADAT AND MUBARAK

Upon Nasser's death, Vice President Anwar Sadat stepped into a
highly centralized political system firmly under the control of Gamal
Abdel Nasser and his loyal elites, most of whom had little regard for the
uncharismatic Sadat. 17 8 Sadat also inherited an economy buckling under
172. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law, supra note 9, at 144.
173. Hamad, supra note 3, at 143. President of the Republic of Egypt Decision No.
81 of 1969 (Establishing the Supreme Constitutional Court), al-JarTdah al-RasmTyah,
1969 (Egypt).
174. Hamad, supra note 3, at 143.
175. Roy & Irelan, supra note 14, at 171. The Supreme Council on Judicial Bodies
was not repealed under Sadat and continued to exist until 2008. See Hamad, supra note
3, at 161-62, 180.; see Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Legal Reforms, the Rule of Law, and
Consolidation of State Authoritarianism under Mubarak, in THE RULE OF LAW, ISLAM,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EGYPT AND IRAN, at 179, 185 (Said Amir Arjomand &
Nathan J. Brown eds., 2013).
176. See AtefShahat Said, supra note 156, at 128.
177. See GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 24.
178. BRUCE RUTHERFORD, EGYPT AFTER MUBARKAK: LIBERALISM, ISLAM, AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD 142 (2008). ("With Nasser's death in 1970, Anwar

Sadat ascended to power and sought to quickly differentiate his regime from Nasser's.");
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Nasser's unsustainable social welfare programs. 7 9 To build his own
base of legitimacy, Sadat adopted a three-pronged strategy. First, he
committed his regime to retaking the Sinai from Israel after Egypt's
devastating defeat in 1967. Second, Sadat declared himself committed to
rule of law, free market economics, and liberalism. This declaration gave
him political cover to undo some of Nasser's most oppressive laws and
80 Sadat
policies while keeping in place others that served his interests.
also freed many of Nasser's political opposition, including the Muslim
Brotherhood, from jails under the auspices of being benevolent and
forgiving.'81 His true intention, however, was to use the Muslim
Brotherhood as a counterbalance to Nasser's socialist elites and
ultimately to marginalize them. 182 Finally, Sadat cloaked himself in
religious legitimacy through public displays of piety as he made sure to
Al Azhar
be seen praying on television and meeting with scholars from
183
scholarship.
Islamic
Sunni
of
center
regional
the
University,
To bolster his credibility before the judiciary, Sadat reinstated many
of the judges dismissed by Nasser in 1969.184 He also passed a new
constitution in 1971 that in principle granted significantly more rights
and liberties to citizens and affirmed the judiciary's role as the guarantor
of those rights. 185 Sadat's desire to attract foreign investment further
Hamad, supra note 3, at 148 ("Sadat had to establish his own legitimacy that
distinguished his regime from that of his predecessor. This was no easy mission as Sadat
lacked Nasser's charisma and the new president's revolutionary credentials were never
comparable to his predecessor.").
179. RUTHERFORD, supra note 178, at 139. ("The Nasserist system was based on an
unsustainable mix of a generous welfare state, a large and inefficient public sector, low
domestic savings rates, and a high degree of insulation from the global economy");
Hamad, supra note 3, at 148 (referencing Nasser's system by stating "[t]he struggling
war economy denied any hopes of legitimacy based on entitlement or social programs for
the lower classes").
180. RUTHERFORD, supra note 178, at 142 ("He released political prisoners; reinstated
civil servants dismissed by Nasser, and returned property sequestered for political
reasons. He also expressed a strong interest in the rule of law. In a speech to the Judges
Club on January 12, 1971, he said, "I shall discuss with the Minister of Justice all
problems that interest you, as judges, and facilitate your work with a view toward
The
creating a legal framework for the Revolution that ensures the supremacy of law ....
judiciary is sacrosanct, surrounded by an aura of sanctity and respect that is an asset to
the entire people.").
181. Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 415.
182. Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 415.
183. Hamad, supranote 3, at 155.
184. Hamad, supra note 3, at 173-74 (noting that 46 of the leading judges purged
were never reinstated because Sadat wanted to build an image of liberalism and rule of
law with minimum political cost).
185. Clark B. Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court: Managing
Constitutional Conflict in an AuthoritarianAspirationally 'Islamic' State, 3 J. COMP. L.
234, 244 (2008); Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 400.
Chapter Five of § 4 of the 1971 Constitutional included at least nine articles devoted
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incentivized him to grant the courts more independence. 86 However,
Sadat declined to reinstate the Supreme Judicial Council and instead
retained the executive-controlled Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies as
the governing entity over judicial affairs. 187 Sadat used the judiciary to
monitor powerful state institutions such as the labor unions, the
intelligence apparatus, the police, and the army so that he could preempt
any challenges to his centralized control. 188 To do so, he granted the
courts more independence to engage in judicial review while at the same
time maintaining control over judges' salaries and opportunities for
lucrative extrajudicial appointments.18 9 Indeed, under Sadat the practice
of seconding judges to executive and legislative positions increased
exponentially and became standard practice under Mubarak's regime.19°
The result was a judiciary whose independence would be constrained by
the Ministry of Justice through its operational and supervisory role over
91
judges and courts.'
Mubarak began his tenure equally concerned with depicting himself
as committed to rule of law to bolster his legitimacy domestically and
internationally. Like Sadat, Mubarak visited the Judges Club, the
Council of State (the "Council"), the Court of Cassation, and the
Supreme Constitutional Court to pay homage to the judiciary. 192 He
publicly affirmed his commitment to judicial independence at the First
Justice Conference in 1984, stating, "I have committed, since the first
day I assumed the responsibility, to wait for judicial rulings in all matters
appropriate for adjudication. I hereby avow all state institutions' respect
of courts' rulings and will enforce them in letter and essence., 193 To that
end, Mubarak's regime issued Law 136 of 1984 that 1) eliminated the
Ministry of Justice's authority over the Council; 194 2) mandated the
approval of the Council's general assembly for appointment of the vice
entirely to matters concerning the judiciary.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, 22 May 1980, 25 May 2005, 26 Mar. 2007, 18 Jan.

2014.
186. See Martin Shapiro, Courts in AuthoritarianRegimes, in RULE BY LAW, supra
note 26, at 330.
187. In 1984, Mubarak restored the Supreme Judicial Council. Brown, Reining in the
Executive, supra note 8, at 141-42.
188. See James Rosberg, Roads to the Rule of Law: The Emergence of an
Independent Judiciary in Contemporary Egypt, 13-15 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).
189. Hamad, supra note 3, at 176, 185.
190. Hamad, supra note 3, at 247-50.
191. Id. at 182.
192. Id.at 212.
193. Id.
194. Law No. 136 of 1984 (Law Instituting Reforms Demanded by the Council's
Members), al-Jarldahal-RasmTyah, 1984, art. 69 (Egypt).
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and deputy presidents of the Council; 95 3) reformed the members'
selection procedures that transferred control to the Council's seven most
senior judges; 196 and 4) granted the Special Council for Administrative
Affairs exclusive jurisdiction over promoting, removing, and disciplining
members of the Council of State.1 97 As a result, the Council was able to
expand its role defending civil and political rights against arbitrary and
unwarranted government action. 198 To the present day, the Council of
State enjoys more formal independence than the ordinary judiciary.
Over the next 25 years, however, Mubarak's action would betray
his rhetoric. He used the Supreme Judicial Council, the Prosecutor
General, and the Ministry of Justice to limit judicial independence to
matters of peripheral relevance to the regime.

99

Again, the courts

became the regime's tool for establishing social controls, sidelining
political opponents, bolstering Mubarak's claim to legal legitimacy, and
resolving coordination problems among competing factions within the
regime. 200 For these reasons, it took a mass uprising on January 25th
rather than elections and incremental reforms to oust Mubarak. The
following sections examine the endogenous and exogenous mechanisms
employed by the Mubarak regime that emboldened the more
conservative, loyalist elements of the judiciary while marginalizing, or
outright harassing, the reformist judges. Over time, these tactics
compromised the judiciary's political insularity, impartiality when the
government is a party, and individual autonomy-all factors that affect
judicial independence.2 ° '
A.

Imposing JudicialSelf-Restraint Through Exogenous and
Endogenous Pressures

Sadat and Mubarak's regime used carrots and sticks to persuade
judicial elites to cooperate on high priority cases in exchange for
maintaining some institutional autonomy on matters that do not threaten
the regime's permanency.20 2
Thus, the centralization of judicial
governance authority permits executive authorities to co-opt the judiciary
195. Law No. 136 of 1984, art 83 (Egypt).
196. Law No. 136 of 1984, art. 83 (Egypt); see also Roy & Irelan, supra note 14, at
181.
197. Law No. 136 of 1984, arts. 100, 101, 102, 112 (Egypt).
198. Hamad, supra note 3, at 220.
199. See Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 416-17
(discussing Mubarak's policy of political de-liberalization).
200. Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 49, at 4; See Rajah, supra note
26, at 945, 948 (discussing how authoritarian regimes use courts to perform "regime
legitimation functions").
201. See Fiss, supra note 48, at 55-56
202. See Id. at 18. See Hamad, supra note 4, at 249-51.
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without having to resort to another 1969 Massacre of the Judiciary
scenario. So long as the executive can persuade (or dissuade) the
leadership of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Supreme
Administrative Court, the Supreme Judicial Council, and the Judges Club
to refrain from challenging the regime on its key interests and allow
internal rivalries and divisions to do the rest, judicial independence can
be circumscribed.2 °3
The Mubarak regime employed a myriad of institutional and legal
mechanisms to incentivize judicial self-restraint while disincentivizing
judicial activism. These mechanisms included the process for appointing
judges, assigning judges to particular cases and courts, appointments to
lucrative secondments in state institutions, and the use of military and
other exceptional courts.2° Some of these restraints have been removed
since the January 25th uprising while others remain in place.20 5 For
instance, the 2014 Constitution removed the president's legal authority to
select both the Chief Justice on the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC)
who presides over the presidential election commission and the
Prosecutor General who sits on the Supreme Judicial Council.20 6
However, the Minister of Justice still appoints the presidents of the
highest courts from among the judges at the appeals courts, some of
whom also serve on the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). 20 7 The Minister
also selects the presidents of the Courts of First Instance who, in turn,
use the significant financial and administrative resources at their
command to subdue the courts' general assemblies from threatening the
regime's interests.20 8 And most significantly, the Minister of Justice
manages the Judicial Inspections Department authorized to initiate
disciplinary hearings against judges that may lead to expulsion or forced
early retirement from the judiciary.20 9 In exchange for their loyalty, the
203. See Brown, Reining in the Executive, supra note 8, at 143.
204. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 22.
205. Id.at 34; see generally SuJrr CHOUDHRY,ET. AL., CTR.FOR CONST. TRANSITIONS
AT NYU LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: APPOINTMENT
MECHANISM

AND

RELATIVE

JUDICIAL

INDEPENDENCE

57-64

(2014),

http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Constitutional-Courtsafter-the-Arab-Spring.pdf (discussing the changes in appointment of judges pre-Mubarak
and post-Mubarak).
206. Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme ConstitutionalCourt, supra note 185, at 241.
207. IBAHRI, supra note 58 at 23.
208. Hamad, supra note 3, at 247.
209. Mahmud al-Khudayari, The Law on Judicial Authority and Judicial
Independence, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, supra note 8, at 45, 47

("According to Article 78 of the judicial authority law, 'A department of judicial
inspection shall be formed in the ministry of justice to inspect the work of judges and
presidents of courts of first instance.' This judicial inspection department deals with all
aspects of the work of members of the Office of Public Prosecution and of judges up to
the grade of president of court of first instance. These judicial personnel attach great
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presidents of the Courts of First Instance, members of the Public
Prosecutor, and members of the Judicial Inspection Department receive
fringe benefits in the form of official cars, government residences, and
subsidized land and housing. 210 Through these various direct and indirect
appointment powers, the executive is able to control senior judges who in
turn restrain, discipline, or expel subordinate judges. 2 1' By controlling
those who guard the guardians, the executive effectively restrains the
judiciary's independence.2 12
Similar to the Judges Club, the Supreme Judicial Council ("SJC")
wields significant power over judges. Although technically a judicial
institution, the composition of the SJC is structured to permit the
executive authority to indirectly interfere with key decisions in a judge's
career.213 The SJC must approve hiring of new judges, promotions,
requests for transfers, secondments and special assignments, and pay
increases.214 The SJC also selects all of the prosecutors and most judges
across the judiciary, thereby granting it significant powers over the
administration of justice and judicial governance. 215 Thus, judges
concerned with their professional and income growth are loath to anger
any member of the SJC. Although the SJC is the judiciary's governing
body that, in theory, shields the judiciary from undue interference by the
executive branch; 2'1 in practice, the SJC's independence is structurally
compromised by the executive branch's powers to appoint the senior
judges who comprise the SJC.2 17
Mubarak reinstated the SJC in 1984 after Nasser abolished it in
1969 as part of his broader assault on the judiciary. 218 The seven

importance to the matter of evaluation because it affects promotion. The judicial
inspection department investigates complaints against judges and suggests penalties. It
also is responsible for preparing the project of the annual judicial 'movement' (rotation of
judges), which includes promotions, transfers, and secondments.").
210. See Hamad, supra note 3 at 253 (noting that such preferential financial treatment
violates Article 68 of the Judicial Authority Law); Khalil, supra note 147, at 65.
211. Brown, Reining in the Executive, supra note 9, at 138; see, e.g., Egypt Refers 60
"pro-Brotherhood'Judges to Disciplinary Board, AL AHRAM ONLINE (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/113517/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-refersproBrotherhood-judges-to-disciplinar.aspx [hereinafter Egypt Refers 60].
212. See GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 17; Brown, Reining in the Executive, supra note 8,
at 137-38.
213. Mahmud al-Khudayari, The Law on Judicial Authority and Judicial
Independence,supra note 210, at 47.
214. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 23-24, 26-28, 44.
215. Hamad, supra note 4, at 68.
216. Mona El-Ghobashy, The Dynamics of Elections Under Mubarak, in THE
JOURNEY TO TAHRIR, supra note 21, at 132, 139.
217. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 28.
218. El-Ghobashy,The Dynamics of Elections Under Mubarak, supra note 216, at
139; Moustafa, Law Versus the State, supra note 8, at 889.
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member SJC is comprised of the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation,
the two most senior Vice Presidents of the Court of Cassation, the Public
Prosecutor, the Chief Judge of the Cairo Appellate Court, the Chief
Judge of the Alexandria Appellate Court, and the Chief Judge of the
Tanta Appellate Court.2 19 Even though they are nominated by judicial
bodies based on seniority, each judge who occupies these positions must
be approved by either the Minister of Justice or the President.22 ° Indeed,
the executive takes great interest in which judges are promoted to these
seven senior posts.
The SJC deploys its broad authority in determining the pay,
promotion, and transfer of judges to reward or punish judges. 221 For
example, a judge whose rulings are consistently unfavorable to the
regime may find himself transferred to a rural area in South Egypt far
from his family and the conveniences of urban life.22 Likewise, a judge
up for promotion as chief of an appellate court may be passed up if the
regime fears he will not exercise his authority to protect the regime's
core interests. 2223 Such decisions often originate from the Minister of
Justice, and while the SJC has the authority to decline to approve the
Minister's decisions, it rarely does so because it could lead to political
retaliation.224 The SJC's gatekeeper role caused Egypt's past presidents
to take great interest in ensuring those promoted to the SJC are either
regime loyalists or at the very least not detractors.22 5 Indeed, reformists
have long accused the executive of making judicial appointments based
on political considerations that would ensure a cooperative SJC, and in
turn a cooperative judiciary.
The chief judge of each appellate court serves another powerful
gatekeeper position. He oversees case assignments in the courts of first
instance and the appellate court within his district, thereby controlling

219. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jaridah al-Rasmyah, 1972,
art. 77 (Egypt).
220. EI-Ghobashy, The Dynamics of Elections Under Mubarak, supra note 216, at
139; see Hamad, supra note 3, at 247 (discussing the role of the Minister of Justice in
appointing judges).
221. Mahmud al-Khudayari, supra note 126, at 47.
222. See Mohamed Sayed Said, A PoliticalAnalysis of the Egyptian Judges' Revolt,
in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, supra note 8, at 19, 21; Sherif Younes,

Judges and Elections: The Politicization of the Judge's Discourse, in JUDGES AND
POLITICAL REFORM INEGYPT, supra note 8, at 151, 164.
223. See Hamad, supra note 3, at 33.
224. Law No. 46 of 1972, (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jaridahal-Rasmyah, 1972,
art. 9 (Egypt).
225. Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Introduction to JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN
EGYPT, supra note 8, at 1, 10.
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which judge will preside over cases important to the regime.226 Should
the chief appellate judge select a judge known for his independence, the
case outcome could jeopardize the regime's agenda. Although the chief
judge is supposed to be selected through nomination by each appellate
jurisdiction's general committee that meets annually to decide on
promotions and transfers, in practice, the committee does not nominate a
judge that they know the Minister of Justice will reject.22 7 Therefore,

ambitious judges are careful not to be perceived as too independent by
the executive lest they be denied future opportunities for promotion. At
the peak of the judicial independence movement in 2005-2006, the
reformist judges unsuccessfully sought to amend the Judicial Authority
Law to change control over appointment of SJC judges from the Ministry
of Justice to an election by judges. 22' The demand remains unmet until
the present day.
The Ministry of Justice has also used its significant influence over
the public prosecution to politicize cases.229 Specifically, the Ministry
takes political factors into account when exercising its authority to
appoint investigating judges, transfer prosecutors at its discretion, and
discipline prosecutors. 230 Other reported abuses of power include
"suggesting" to prosecutors that certain investigations should be dropped
or started.231 Should a prosecutor refuse to cooperate with the Minister's
request, he likely faces retaliation through transfers to unattractive
positions that are effectively demotions in quality of work, pay, and
status.
The Ministry has mastered these informal tactics such that it
provides pretextual reasons when accused of undue politicization of
judicial affairs. When such efforts fail to bring prosecutors into line, the
executive assigns sensitive cases to the State Security Prosecution
Department.23 3 State security prosecutors are notorious for their loyalty
to the regime and are well compensated in return for handling cases
involving public demonstrations, torture, and Islamists in accordance
226.

IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 26; see MOHAMED NOUR FARHAT & ALI SADEK,

ARAB CTR. FOR DEV. RULE L. & INTEGRITY, REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY IN

43-44,
http://www.arabruleoflaw.org/Files/PDF/Judiciary/English/P2/EgyptFinalReportP2S4_
En.pdf (discussing the overall work distribution structure in the court of appeals).
227. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 26; Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), alJarTdahal-Rasmtyah, 1972, art. 30-31, 36 (Egypt).
228. El-Ghobashy, supra note 216, at 139; BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 47,
at 10; see generally Bernard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 139.
229. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 45; see Hamad, supra note 3, at 245-47.
230. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 43; see FARHAT & SADEK, supra note 226, at 38
("Minister of Justice has the right to supervise and control the prosecution ... .
231. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 45.
232. Id. at 43; Mohamed Sayed Said, supra note 222, at 19,21.
233. Hamad, supra note 3, at 246.
EGYPT
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with the regime's instructions.234 The Minister of Justice also selects
investigating judges in high profile criminal cases known for their
favorable stances towards the prosecution. 235 At the same time, the
Minister can withhold appointing an independent-minded judge to
investigate alleged criminal acts by regime loyalists.236 Because the
investigating judge's report is considered credible evidence in a trial, a
politicized selection process has adverse consequences on the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
Another powerful disciplining mechanism in the executive's
toolbox is the committee that investigates judges' alleged ethical and
legal violations. Despite the judiciary's repeated requests to transfer it to
the SJC, the Judicial Inspection Department ("JID") remains under the
control of the Ministry of Justice. 237 Its authority to review, evaluate,
and recommend promotion or discipline procedures makes the JID one of
the most powerful departments within the Ministry of Justice. 238 The
Minister appoints the judge who heads the JID, and in effect, utilizes it to
punish judges in the regular courts who go too far in challenging
executive actions.239 Some judges, as a result, have been pushed out of
the judiciary through baseless investigations used to harass and
embarrass them.24 In exchange for closing the file and avoiding an
adverse ruling, the Ministry of Justice calls for the judge's resignation.241
Others are coerced to leave the country to limit their influence over other
judges.
A case in point is the referral of senior judges Mahmoud Mekki and
Hisham Al-Bastawisi to internal disciplinary hearings after they publicly
condemned vote rigging and election irregularities in the 2005

234. Id. at 245-46 (noting that state security prosecutors receive generous financial
remuneration, ample opportunities for professional development, and career prospects
inside and outside of the judiciary).
235. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 43; Khalil,,supra note 147, at 60.
236. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 43; see, e.g., Egypt: Rights Activists at Risk of Prison,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/05/egypt-rightsactivists-risk-prison (discussing investigative judges power in the criminal courts and the
summons ofNasser Amin and numerous NGO group leaders).
237. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarldah al-Rasmiyah, 1972,
art. 78 (Egypt); IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 7; Hamad, supra note 3, at 247.
238. Hamad, supra note 3, at 183-84.
239. 7 judges sent to retirement for MB affiliation, MADA MASR (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.madamasr.com/content/7-judges-sent-retirement-mb-affiliation;
Moustafa,
Resistance, supranote 53, at 138-39.
240. Sahar Aziz, Egypt's Judiciary, Coopted, CARNEGE ENDOWMENT (Aug. 20,

2014),
http://camegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfin?fa-show&article=56426&solr-hilite.
241. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 29.
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parliamentary elections.242 Although the disciplinary board found Mekki

innocent while giving Al-Bastawisi a mild reprimand, the two judges
soon thereafter left the country for Kuwait presumably under pressure
from the regime. 243 The case sent a chilling244message to reformist judges
who took their independence too earnestly.
A more severe disciplining process occurred after the military
deposed Mohamed Morsi. The sixty judges who condemned the deposal
of Morsi as a military coup were investigated and systematically purged
from the judiciary. 245 These judges had signed a statement on July 24,
2013, in support of the sit-in at Al-Raba'a Al-Adawiya opposing what
they declared was the July 3 rd military coup. 24 6 Another 16 judges, who
call themselves "Judges for Egypt," were also expelled from the
By declaring Morsi's
judiciary through disciplinary proceedings.

presidential victory before the delayed official results were released, the
247
judges were accused of participating in politics in violation of the JAL.

In conjunction with disincentives for ruling against the regime's
interests, judges are incentivized to impose harsh sentences against

defendants in high profile political cases in exchange for well-paid
secondments to the Ministry of Justice, international organizations, or
embassies abroad as special counselors. 248 Because the basic salaries of
judges are not sufficient to cover the expenses of a middle class family

and have not kept up with inflation, secondments make judges more
dependent on the executive branch for this supplementary income.

249

The lack of transparency and the absence of objective criteria for
242.

Samer Shehata & Joshua Stacher, The Muslim Brothers in Mubarak's Last

Decade, in THE JOURNEY TO TAHRm, supra note 21, at 160, 167.
243. Id. at 168.
244. Id. at 167; see, e.g., Michael Slackmann & Mona El-Naggar, Police Beat Crowds
2006),
12,
(May
TIMES
N.Y.
Judges,
Egypt's
Backing
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.htil?pagewanted=print;
Ben Wedeman et al., Egypt Cracks Down on Critics, CNN (May 18, 2006),
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/05/18/egypt.crackdown/.
245. Egypt Refers 60, supra note 211; 41 Judges referred to retirementfor political
activity, MADA MASR (Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.madamasr.com/news/41-judgesreferred-retirement-political-activity.
246. Egypt Refers 60, supra note 211; 41 Judges referred to retirementfor political
activity, supra note 245.
247. Egypt Refers 60, supra note 211; 41 Judges referred to retirementfor political
activity, supra note 245; Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jardah alRasmTyah, 1972, art. 73 (Egypt); 7 Judges Sent to Retirementfor MB Affiliation, supra
note 239; Judges Investigated for Brotherhood Ties, MADA MASR (Oct. 21, 2014),
http://www.madamasr.com/news/judges-investigated-brotherhood-ties.
248. Nathan J. Brown, Why do Egyptian courts say the darndest things?, WASH POST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey2014),
25,
(Mar.
cage/wp/2014/03/25/why-do-egyptian-courts-say-the-darndest-things/.
249. Hamad, supra note 3, at 248-49; Moustafa, Law Versus the State, supra note 8,
at 894, 921;
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seconding judges makes the process ripe for abuse.25 0 For instance, the
Ministry of Justice is notorious for rewarding compliant judges with
temporary transfers to non-judicial posts as governors or legal experts in
government ministries where there monthly salaries are supplemented up
to 20,000 Egyptian pounds-more than double an average judge's
salary.5 Similarly, the President must approve secondments to foreign
governments, international organizations, or Egyptian embassies
abroad-all of which entail significant fringe benefits and higher pay.252
Both the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Judicial Council influence
which judges are rewarded or denied such opportunities, and do so taking
into consideration the judge's rulings on cases important to the regime.
The executive branch also exercises significant influence in the
vetting and initial hiring of judges. Domestic security forces collaborate
with the Minister of Justice to thoroughly vet judicial candidates for any
affiliations with the MB, political opposition groups, and criminal
activities.25 3 Anyone found to possess even the slightest anti-government
leanings or to have an extended family member associated with political
opposition groups, particularly the MB, is barred from entering the
judiciary regardless of his qualifications.25 4 While some may argue this
produces a desirable apolitical judiciary, the objective is to exclude
prospective judges who may exercise their role as neutral arbiters to the
detriment of the executive's interests, not necessarily to depoliticize the
judiciary.255 Hiring decisions penalize sitting judges involved in the
judicial independence movement through the rejection of their otherwise
qualified sons and relatives.256
Fragmenting the judiciary is another common tactic employed by
authoritarians to incentivize cooperation and disincentivize independent
adjudication on cases important to the regime. Following Nasser's
250. Hamad, supra note 3, at 249.
251. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 26-27; Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law),
al-Jaridahal-RasmTyah, 1972, art. 62 (Egypt).
252. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 27.
253. Bernard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 13; Omar Mekky, Evolution of the
Refaiest
in
Egyptian politics,
KUWAIT
TIMES
(Sept.
17,
2012),
http://news.kuwaittimes.net/evolution-of-the-refaiest-in-egyptianpolitics/.http://news.kuwaittimes.net/evolution-of-the-refaiest-in-egyptian-politics/;
see
also Hamad, supra note 3, at 63-64 (discussing generally the goal of finding
"independent-minded" judges with "guarantees of judicial independence").
254. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 47, at 9; Mekky, supranote 253.
255. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 47, at 8-10. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS
JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 212-

213 (2004) (generally discussing the shift in regimes that are vesting greater authority in
the judiciary and the possible explanations for this phenomenon).
256. See Hamad, supra note 3, at 255 (describing the case of the SJC's decision not to
hire the son of the Judge's Club vice president and the senior Council of State Justice in
retaliation for their disloyal acts of independence).
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precedent, Mubarak created special security courts to quash political
257
Islamist groups.
dissidents belonging to the MB and other political
For example, Law 105 of 1980 created special courts with exclusive
25 8 In creating
jurisdiction over specific financial and economic offenses.
a fragmented judicial system, Mubarak heavily circumscribed due
process rights, prohibited appeals of state security court rulings, and
2 9
The more
retained the authority to order retrials if he wished. 1
the
fragmented
more
the
behaved,
judiciary
regular
the
independent
26
executive
with
complied
judges
more
judicial system became. 0 The
agendas, the more the regime allowed political cases to remain within the
regular courts' jurisdiction. 261 By the end of Mubarak's tenure, special
security courts were actively trying MB members as part of a broader
crackdown on dissent. In contrast, Adly Mansour and Abdel-Fatah Al
Sisi's government permitted the ordinary judiciary to prosecute MB
members, Morsi supporters, and youth revolutionaries, further evincing
the judiciary's willingness to buttress the regime's counter-revolutionary
agenda.
Although the executive branch uses courts to advance the regime's
2 62
interests, courts sometimes transform into sites of political resistance.
The next section explores the endogenous factors that produced a shortlived independence movement that prompted the executive to retaliate by
packing the SCC and installing regime loyalists in senior judicial
positions. With a de-liberalized SCC, loyalists in the judicial leadership,
and a weakened judicial reformist camp, the probability of judicial

257. 'June Ray, Human Rights Protectionand the Rule of Law: Case Studies in Israel
and Egypt, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, at 43, 48-49 (Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds.,

2000) (describing political dissident defendants' lack of access to lawyers, families, and
evidence to be used against them).
258. Law No. 105 of 1980 (Law on the Establishment of State Security Court), alJarfdah al-Rasmfyah, 21 May 1980 (Egypt); BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 47, at
3.
259. Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 49, at 17-18; IBAHRI, supra
note 58, at 34.
260. Bentlage, supra note 58, at 254-56. But see Brown, Reining in the Executive,
supra note 8, at 136 (noting that over the past two decades more fundamental issues of
governance are brought before the ordinary judiciary as a result of a strong administrative
court system and constitutional court). See also Luke M. Milligan, CongressionalEndRun: The Ignored Constrainton Judicial Review, 45 GA. L. REv. 211 (2011). Judicial
fragmentation is a type of hydraulics wherein political actors evade or work around
structural judicial decisions.
261. Fattah, supra note 63, at 275; Rutherford, supranote 178, at 299.
262. Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 49, at 2; see generally Lama
Abu Odeh, The Supreme ConstitutionalCourt of Egypt: The Limits of Liberal Political
Science and CLS Analysis of Law Elsewhere, 59 Am.J. COMP. L. 985 (2011) (discussing
the "trade-off' between the SCC and the executive regime).
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support for revolutionary demands post-January 25, 2011, was slim from
the start.
B.

Bouts of JudicialIndependence Under Mubarak

Throughout its history, the Egyptian judiciary has struggled to stop
executive interference in judicial governance, electoral processes, and
case outcomes. 22663 Prior to the 1952 revolution, judges and lawyers were
prestigious professionals at the frontlines of opposing foreign occupation
and defending (thick) rule of law. 26 With Nasser's nationalization of the
economy and open access to higher education, law school enrollment
was no longer limited to the best and brightest and lawyers' incomes
plummeted.265 As a consequence, the quality of lawyering and judging
suffered.266
Nevertheless, on at least six occasions under Mubarak's reign, the
Egyptian judiciary pushed for legal reforms that would bolster its
institutional independence and expand its judicial review powers to
challenge executive action. First, the Judges Club held its inaugural
Judicial Conference in 1986 to discuss the state of judicial independence.
The Conference issued resolutions calling for removal of the
government's emergency laws and other laws that restricted civil and
political

rights.267

The judges

also

demanded

financial

and

administrative independence from the Ministry of Justice, and judicial
supervision of elections. 268 Notably, the resolutions also called for
adherence to Islamic law in legislation, which reflected the Islamist
tendencies of the reformist judges. 269 These judges and their disciples
would portentously spearhead the judicial independence movement in
2005-2006.

263. See ALAA AL AswANY, ON THE STATE OF EGYPT: WHAT MADE THE REVOLUTION
INEVITABLE 104 (2011); Bernard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 13-14; Moustafa, Law

Versus the State, supra note 8, at 897; Mekky, supra note 253.
264. Moustafa, Law Versus the State, supra note 8, at 897.
265. Tamir Moustafa, Mobilising the Law in an Authoritarian State: The Legal

Complex in Contemporary Egypt, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE
STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 193, 194 (Terence C.

Halliday, Lucien Karpik, & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2007).
266. Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 49, at 14-15, 21; see generally,
Hamad, supra note 3, at 296-299 ("The regime might try to circumvent judicial decisions
using a plethora of legal and political tactics to avoid implementing rulings that are
ominous to its basic interests.").
267. Article 148 of 1971 Constitution granted the president significant power to
declare a state of emergency and consequently exercise extraordinary powers. Lombardi,
Constitutionas Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 411.

268.
269.

AtefShahat Said, supranote 156, at 120-21, 123; Mekky, supra note 253.
A1-Sayyed, supra note 107, at 231.
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Following the First Judicial Conference, the Judges Club general
assembly instructed the president of the Court of Cassation to draft a law
incorporating the key recommendations arising from the Conference.
They included: 1) an independent budget; 2) the total independence of
the Supreme Judicial Council from the Ministry of Justice; 3)
transferring the Judicial Inspection Department from the Ministry of
Justice to the Supreme Judicial Council; 4) prohibiting secondment of
judges to non-judicial positions; 5) regulating judicial secondments; and
6) creating a National Center for Judicial Studies to train judges
throughout their careers.27 ° When nothing came of this effort, the new
Judges Club president Justice Yahya Al-Rifa'i invited the general
assembly to draft a new judicial authority, which was approved on
January 19, 1991.271 This draft law became a template for subsequent
judicial reform efforts, including those proposed by Morsi's regime 20
years later.
The second instance occurred five years later in 1991, under the
leadership of Judge Yahya al-Rifa'i, when the Judges Club aggressively
negotiated with the Ministry of Justice to amend the JAL to disentangle
judges from executive control.272 Judges wanted to eliminate the
Minister of Justice's authority to appoint and annually confirm chief
judges to the Courts of First Instance. 273 They also sought to curtail the
Minister's indirect control of these courts' general assemblies by virtue
274 To minimize executive
of his authority to endorse their decisions.
capture of the SJC, judges demanded that the Supreme Council for
Justice be elected by the General Assemblies of the Court of Cassation
and the Court of Appeal in Cairo as opposed to appointed by the
executive branch.275 The judicial reform proposals again sought to
transfer the Justice Ministry's administrative supervision to the courts
and the Supreme Council of Justice's supervision to judges elected by

270. Atef Shahat Said, supra note 156, at 116-17.
271. Id. at 116.
272. Bentlage, supra note 157, at 255.
273. Id.; see Al-Khudayari, supra note 126, at 47 (discussing the underlying reason of
the Judge's Club proposal to include judge's in the selection process due to executive
interference through the Minister of Justice's authority to appoint judges to specific

courts).
274.
275.

Bentlage, supra note 157, at 255.
Id. at 255-56.
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other judges.27 6 Despite persistent efforts to get the draft passed by the
People's Assembly, it languished in the Minister of Justice's office.277
Although there were no immediate changes to the JAL, these efforts
created political space for the Supreme Constitutional Court ("SCC") to
issue dozens of opinions in the 1990s that expanded basic rights and
reined in executive excesses. In turn, these decisions emboldened civil
society to defend individual rights through human rights litigation.27
For instance, in 1992 the SCC ruled that the Egyptian government was
constitutionally required to respect international human rights norms,
which Mubarak perceived as a threat to his power. 279 The SCC struck
down laws that restricted citizens' rights to establish political parties,
stripped prominent opposition leaders of their political rights, and denied
independent candidates the right to run in parliamentary elections. 281 It
also struck down a law banning any political party opposed to peace with
Israel, overturned laws that interfered with governance of workers'
syndicates, 281 and struck down laws that prohibited criticism of public
servants on grounds that such laws violated constitutional rights of free
speech.282 The SCC's liberal rulings extended to noncitizens when it
ruled that denying noncitizens deprived of their property rights access to
the national courts was unconstitutional.2 83 In 1995, the Labor Party
successfully challenged the constitutionality of criminal provisions that
imposed joint liability on heads of political parties, reporters, and editorsin-chief for alleged libel of public officials in party newspapers. 2 8
By the late 1990s, public interest litigation became the primary
forum through which civil society pursued legal reform. 85
276.

Id; see Antoine Nasri Messarra, Empowering Magistracy in the Arab World, in

TOWARDS A BETTER LIFE: HOW TO IMPROVE THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE

EAST, at 149, 169-71, www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/mepi20lO.pdf (discussing the Judges
Club's call for amendments of the laws that would allow it to be more independent from

the executive power).
277.
278.

A1-Khudayari, supra note 126, at 46.
Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 49, at 12-13; ALBRECHT,
RAGING AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 52, at 33; Moustafa, Law Versus the State,
supra note 8, at 884; Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme ConstitutionalCourt, supra note 185,
at 244; RUTHERFORD, supra note 178, at 18.
279. Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 420.
280. Abdel Omar Sherif, The Rule of Law in Egypt from a JudicialPerspective: A
Digest of the LandmarkDecisions of the Supreme ConstitutionalCourt, in THE RULE OF
LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD, supra note 257, at 1, 7-9 (discussing
the numerous and various actions taken by the SCC during the 80's and 90's).
281. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 8, at 147 (citing Case No.
44, Judicial Year 7 (May 7, 1998) and Case No. 6, Judicial Year 15 (Apr. 15, 1995)).
282. Sherif, supra note 280, at 20.
283. Id. at 14.
284. Id. at 18-19.
285. Moustafa, Principles,supra note 1, at 94.
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Notwithstanding these liberal rulings, the SCC did not dare strike down
the emergency laws or prohibit military trials of civilians lest it invite
executive retaliation.2 86 Nor did the SCC grant citizens the right to
287
appeal emergency or military court rulings to the regular courts.
A dysfunctional political system unresponsive to civil society
interests made litigation an attractive alternative in pursuing social
change.28 8 Indeed, Egyptians gained a political voice through human
289 The more the
rights litigation that publicized government abuses.
courts issued rulings in favor of civil liberties and democratic principles,
the more civil society, opposition political parties, and professional
organizations defended the judiciary's independence against executive
incursions. 290 Because political mobilization could ultimately topple a
regime, Mubarak tolerated human and civil rights litigation as a
291 The end result
controllable mechanism for venting public grievances.
was a protective constituency that believed the judiciary would be an ally
2 This optimism turned out to be
after the January 25 th uprisings.29
woefully displaced, as further discussed in Section V.
The third exertion of judicial independence came via a
transformative ruling in 2000 in which the SCC declared that the
Constitution mandated that judges monitor all national elections. This
decision paved the way for the judiciary's boldest challenge of executive
power in 2005-2006.293 Shortly after the SCC's ruling, Justice Hussam
Al-Ghiryani issued a ruling invalidating the 2000 parliamentary election
294
Justice A1-Ghiryani found
results in the East Cairo district of Zeitoun.
Cases Authority and the
State
the
of
that the inclusion of members
Administrative Prosecution Authority as elections monitors violated the
SCC's ruling because these entities did not qualify as judicial entities
29
authorized to supervise the elections. ' The Judges Club also issued a
286. See Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 49, at 16; Moustafa, Law
Versus the State, supra note 8, at 903; Moustafa, Resistance, supra note 53, at 151.
287. See Moustafa, Resistance,supra note 53, at 151.
288. See GLOPPEN, supra note 3, at 166; Brown, Reining in the Executive, supra note
8, at 135.
289. Moustafa & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 49, at 13, 21; see Ruti Teitel,
TransitionalJurisprudence:The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J.
2009, 2032 (1997) (asserting that constitutional courts assist in developing fledgling
democracies through litigation).
290. Hamad, supra note 3,at 303, 305-307.
291. SOLIMAN, supra note 2, at 142; see generally Egypt: 'Shouting slogans into the
wind': Human rights concerns ahead of the parliamentary elections, AMNESTY INT'L
(Nov. 21, 2010), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mdel 2/032/2010/en/.
292. See generally Brown, Reining in the Executive, supra note 8, at 143, 149.
293. See Nathalie Bernhard-Maugiron, Legal Reforms, the Rule of Law, and
Consolidationof State Authoritarianismunder Mubarak, supra note 176, at 187.
294. Hamad, supra note 4, at 267.
295. Hamad, supra note 3,at 267-68.
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"Black List" of 13 judges who allegedly collaborated with the executive
branch to engage in electoral fraud in their supervision of elections.296 In
retaliation, the Supreme Judicial Council issued official reprimands
against Justice Al-Ghiryani and Justice Ahmed Mekky, both leading
judge in the independence movement. The judges responded by
convening an extraordinary general assembly of over 3000 judges on
March 12, 2004, denouncing the SJC's actions.297
The fourth push against the Mubarak regime's attempts to control
the judiciary came when a group of reformist judges led by Judge
Zakaria Abdel Aziz won the Judges Club elections in 2002 under the
"Change and Renewal" list. 298 Besides mobilizing judges to demand
electoral reforms, the Judges Club again pressured the executive to
amend the JAL to give the judiciary more autonomy and eliminate the
manipulation of secondments to indirectly influence judges. 299 For
example, the Judges Club sought to amend Article 62 of the JAL to
provide that "it is not possible to second [udges] to work [in a capacity]
other than their own judicial work which is within their jurisdiction
according to the provisions of the Constitution and the law., 300 Their
secondment for legal and administrative work for the executive and
legislative authorities or for public and private bodies is prohibited."3 1
The judges also wanted to grant the Supreme Judicial Council, rather
than the Minister of Justice, the authority to appoint presidents of the
courts of first instance, to create sub-courts created within the
jurisdiction of a court of first instance, and to select the location of where
such sub-courts sit. 30 2 As a result, the new Judges Club leadership
created a committee to promote the adoption and revision of the 1991
judicial authority draft law.303
After witnessing pervasive electoral fraud in the 2005 parliamentary
elections, reform-minded judges in control of the Judges Club formed an
investigative committee-the fifth key event in the judiciary's
independence movement. Following the lead of a young female judge in
296. Id.at 276.
297. Id. at 267.
298. Mekky, supra note 253; see Hamad, supra note 3, at 265-66 (discussing how
"[i]n 2001 the reformer Zakaria 'Abd el-Aziz surprisingly defeated the three-term
president of the Judges Club, Moqbel Shaker").
299. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 36; see also Shapiro, supra note 68, at 332
(discussing the need for judges to persuade their colleagues to create winning coalitions
that produce rights-oriented judicial leadership).
300. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 38.
301. Id.at 38 (quoting Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), 1972, art. 62
(Egypt)).
302. Id. at 38 n.168 (recounting proposed amendments to Article 11 of Judicial
Authority Law No. 46 of 1972).
303. AtefShahat Said, supra note 156, at 118.
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the Office of Administrative Prosecution, Noha Al-Zini, who publicly
disclosed these violations, a group of judges collected testimony from
3°4 The self-described
their colleagues who witnessed similar fraud.
judicial independence movement convened three general assembly
meetings in 2005 and 2006 that culminated in the publication of a report
denouncing the election abuses and citing various cases of election fraud
witnessed by judges.3 °5
The executive swiftly retaliated. The loyalist Supreme Judicial
Council threatened to investigate any judges who spoke to the press
about election fraud.30 6 Any such speech was allegedly political activity
30 7
The Ministry of Justice
in violation of the Judicial Authority Law.
all Judges Clubs-the
to
gave
also suspended the annual subsidies it
30 8 The Mubarak
primary source of funding for judge's fringe benefits.
regime passed a new law that transferred authority to distribute judicial
30 9 The
fringe benefits from the Judges Club to the Ministry of Justice.
government also amended the Constitution in 2007 to substantially
weaken the role of judges in overseeing future elections by allowing non310
judicial officials to serve as elections monitors.
Mubarak felt sufficiently threatened to use force against the judges
when judges joined a protest in 2006 in front of the Judges Club in
Cairo-the sixth and final push for independence. Egyptian police
31 1 "Nearly 150
attacked the protesters and assaulted some judges.
2
the judges'. 31
'supporting
of
protesters were arrested on charges
Among those arrested was Dr. Mohamed Morsi, who was portentously to
become Egypt's first democratically elected president after the January
25 th uprisings.3 13 The following month, Mubarak instructed Judge Abo
El-leil, then Minister of Justice, to refer two leading judges from the
Judges Club to disciplinary proceedings on pretextual charges of

304. Bernard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 2 ("According to the club, 151 judges out
of 160 agreed to testify, and they confirmed al-Zini's testimony that the Muslim
Brotherhood candidate received three times as many votes as the ruling National
Democratic Party's (NDP) candidate. A complaint was filed at the general
prosecutor's office, but it received no response.").
305. AtefShahat Said, supranote 156, at 123-26.
306. Bentlage, supra note 157, at 264.
307. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jardah al-Rasmiyah, 1972,
art. 73 (Egypt).
308. Bernard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 2; Bentlage, supra note 157, at 265.
309. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 47, at 5.
310. Moustafa, Revolt, supra note 61, at 184; Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to
Agree, supra note 8, at 423 n.25.
311. See e.g., Bemard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 3.
312. Mekky, supra note 253; Bentlage, supra note 157, at 266.
313. Mekky, supra note 253.
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"insulting the judiciary" for allegedly defaming a fellow judge.3 14 As the
hearings were taking place, massive and well-equipped security forces
surrounded the Judges Club, the Court of Cassation, the journalists'
syndicate, and the lawyers' syndicate.315 The unprecedented use of force
against judges was a clear warning of the government's intent to
crackdown hard on anyone planning to challenge the regime's
centralized grip on power. And their status as judicial elites would not
protect them.
Intent on decisively crushing the judicial independence movement,
the executive employed administrative and legal means to change the
Club's leadership to pro-regime judges. 317 Because the Judges Club is
not a non-government organization or a professional syndicate,318 the
Ministry of Social Affairs announced in January 2007 that the Club must
register as an association under the 2002 law on associations. 3 19 The
move was aimed to bring the Judges Club under the administrative
control of the executive and tame the judicial independence movement
for once and for all. 320 Although the Judges Club ultimately submitted
its registration papers, the process was dismissed after the SCC struck
down the civil society law as unconstitutional. The Judges Club remains
an organization not subject to regulation by civil society or professional
syndicate laws.321
The confrontation between the Mubarak regime and the Judges
Club culminated in a retaking of the Cairo Judges Club in 2009 by
regime loyalist Ahmed El Zind who served as the Minister of Justice
under President Sisi. Taking from Sadat's playbook, the Mubarak
regime appealed to judges' material interests by promising financial
benefits if government loyalists were elected to the Judges Club board.3 22
Some of the leading dissident judges were "encouraged" to work outside
the country or retire. 323 At the same time, government-controlled media
defamed the judicial independence movement by accusing them of
314. Id.; Bernard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 3.
315. Bentlage, supra note 157, at 266-67.
316. See Hamad, supra note 3, at 275-78, 286.
317. Id. at 287-90 (discussing the different attempts made by the regime to weaken
the Judge's Club); Bemard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 5.
318. AtefShahat Said, supra note 156, at 114.
319. Bernard-Maugiron, supra note 225, at 4.
320. See id; see Bentlage, supra note 157, at 248-52; see e.g., Dina Shehata, Egypt:
Judges Club Challenges the Regime, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
(2009),
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Shehata.pdf ("The Judges Club had been lobbying the
Egyptian government for nearly 15 years to pass a law freeing the judiciary from
financial and administrative control by the Ministry of Justice.");.
321. See ALBRECHT, RAGING AGAINST THE MACHINE, supranote 52, at 157-63.
322. Hamad, supra note 3, at 197-98, 288.
323. See Mekky, supra note 253.
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engaging in politics and alluded to their loyalties to the Muslim
Brotherhood.3 24 Furthermore, loyalist judges accused reformist judges of
being secretly affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood with illicit
motives. 325 That many of the reformist judges self-identified as Islamists
made it easier for the government to cast aspersions on their motives as a
threat to national security.
Upon his election to president of the Judges Club, Al-Zind and his
faction got to work on undermining the credibility of the reformist
movement by accusing them of inflating the number of participants in
the general assembly meetings that issued resolutions condemning
executive action. The loyalist camp cast aspersions on the motives of
Justices Mekky, Abdel Aziz, and Al-Ghiryani by alleging they were
pursuing their own personal interests, allied with the political Islamist
opposition, and went as far as accusing the three judges of treason.326
Concerned that his regime's crackdown on the judiciary
compromised his reputation abroad, Mubarak supported the National
Democratic Party's amendments to the JAL through Law No. 142 of
2006 to give the impression that his regime was committed to rule of
law. 327 The most significant concessions secured by the judges included
requiring the SJC's confirmations of all judicial appointments and
secondments to the Ministry of Justice with the exception of the
undersecretaries and appointment of judges to the Judicial Inspection
Department.3 28 The SJC also confirmed appointment of the Assistant
Public Prosecutor, the First Public Attorney, and all other members of
the Public Prosecution Department.32 9 Secondments of judges to foreign
governments or international organizations also required the SJC's
approval.33 ° Similarly, the Ministry of Justice no longer had supervisory
authority over public prosecutors and could no longer instruct the Public
Prosecutor to initiate disciplinary actions against a particular
prosecutor. 331 The judiciary finally attained a key demand in obtaining
an independent budget prepared by the SJC in collaboration with the
Minister of Finance.332

324. Hamad, supra note 3, at 273; Mekky, supra note 253.
325. See Hamad, supra note 3, at 299 (stating that the government may try to
"discredit activists judges in the eyes of public opinion" through the media).
326. AtefShahat Said, supra note 156, at 127.
327. Al-Khudayari, supra note 126, at 46.
328. Law No. 142 of 2006 (Description of Law), al-Jardahal-RasmTyah, 2006, arts.
45 & 46 (Egypt).
329. Law 42 of 2006, art. 119 (Egypt).
330. Law 42 of 2006, art. 65 (Egypt).
331. Khalil, supra note 147, at 65.
332. Law No. 42 of 2006, arts. 93 & 77 (Egypt).
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While such amendments diluted the Ministry of Justice's formal
control over the judiciary, they place more pressure on the SJC to use its
powers in the interest of the regime. In turn, the executive is more likely
to seek informal means of interventions in the appointment of judges to
positions constituting the SJC. For example, a reformist judge up for an
SJC position may be offered an attractive secondment to make room for
the next judge in line whom the regime views as loyalist. For this
reason, future efforts to preserve judicial independence should focus on
ensuring the SJC, in composition and legal authorities, is shielded from
the executive branch's political and financial controls. The most
significant short term win for the judges was their success in halting the
regime's efforts to increase the mandatory retirement age again, resulting
in the retirement of the chief justice of the SCC and the presidents of the
333
Court of Cassation and Cairo's Court of Appeals.
Despite these reforms, Mubarak rejected some important demands
by the judges. For instance, the Judicial Inspections Department remains
under the control of the Ministry of Justice.334 The regime also refused
to include objective criteria in the JAL for seconding judges because that
would constrain the executive branch's control over selecting and
assigning prosecutors and influencing judicial behavior. 335 Likewise, no
objective criteria were added to guide the selection of the Public
Prosecutor and the presidents of the Courts of First Instance-both
politically sensitive positions.336 Requests for a judicial police force to
enforce judicial rulings and assist judges in electoral supervision were
also rejected.33 7 Perhaps the biggest defeat was Mubarak's refusal to
allow judges to elect members from the Court of Cassation and Cairo's
Court of Appeals to serve on the SJC as opposed to appointing them
based on seniority. From the executive's position, it was easier to
influence appointed senior judges than elected representatives to an SJC
with expanded powers.338
To be sure, the Egyptian judiciary is in a difficult bind.339 On the
one hand, it must be careful how far it pushes back on executive policies
so as to avoid extermination, as occurred under Nasser in the 1969
Massacre of the Judiciary.34 ° On the other hand, judges have an
institutional interest in preserving the legitimacy of the judiciary so as to

333. Hamad, supra note 3, at 280.
334. Al-Khudayari, supra note 126, at 47-48.
335. See Hamad, supranote 3, at 281.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See Shapiro, supra note 68, at 335.
340. See Moustafa, Resistance, supra note 53, at 134.
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incentivize compliance with the law, preserve order, and bolster their
status in society.141 Some judges may find that, while the auxiliary state
security courts violate citizens' substantive and procedural due process
rights, the ordinary courts could join the citizenry in condemning such
actions and claim clean hands. Other judges may find that the judiciary's
institutional interests lie in expansive jurisdiction, which keeps political
cases within the ordinary courts and judges cooperating with executive
political agendas.
A case in point is the Supreme Constitutional Court. Although it
had been one of the only formal sites of meaningful resistance during the
1990S,342 by the time the 2005-2006 judicial independence movement
was underway, the SCC had been effectively emasculated.343
Throughout much of the 1990s, the SCC bolstered its prestige and power
through liberal rulings on social and political rights. 3 " The Mubarak
regime tolerated the SCC because the justices were also delivering liberal
rulings on economic reforms. 345 However, the SCC's seminal 2000
ruling mandating judicial oversight of elections went too far for the
regime. With the slowing pace of controversial economic reforms, the
regime was less dependent on the SCC for favorable rulings.346
Meanwhile, the Court's expansion of social and political rights had
emboldened civil society to leverage international pressure to demand
systemic political reforms.34 7 To curb this menacing trend, the President
appointed, in 2002, Fathi Naguib, who previously was second in
command at the Ministry of Justice and President of the Court of
341.
342.

Ginsburg, supra note 108, at 725.
See generally Kilian Balz, Human Rights, the Rule of Law and the Construction

of Tradition, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD, supra

note 257, at 35.
343. Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court, supra note 185, at 235;
ALBRECHT, RAGING AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 52, at 157-58; see Moustafa, Law
Versus the State, supra note 8, at 924-925; Javed Maswood & Usha Natarajan,
Democratizationand ConstitutionalReform in Egypt and Indonesia:Evaluating the Role
of the Military, in ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT: REVOLUTION AND BEYOND (eds. Bahgat
Korany & Rabab A] Mahdi 2012)
344. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW, supranote 8, at 153.
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party's free market economic policies).
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Cassation. 348 Naguib was the lead drafter of illiberal election legislation,
Law 153 of 1999, which the SCC had struck down as unconstitutional.349
With this unprecedented move of appointing a chief justice from
outside the SCC, Mubarak effectively took control of the Court.35 ° Soon
after taking office, Naguib increased the number of justices from 9 to
15.351 Breaking the tradition of selecting new justices from the Council
of State, Naguib packed the Court with justices from the ordinary courts
whose jurisprudence was deferential to executive power.3 52 Within a
short period, the SCC's liberal majority was eliminated and the judicial
independence movement weakened, producing a judiciary poised to
support the military-security state apparatus in its counter-revolutionary
measures. 353 When Naguib unexpectedly passed away in 2003, Mubarak
appointed Mamdouh Marra, who was the President of the Cairo Court of
Appeals and previously presided over the Judicial Inspection
Department-a position offered only to regime loyalists.354 When Marra
reached the age of retirement in 2006, Mubarak replaced him with the
Public Prosecutor Maher Abdel Wahid.355 This pattern of political
appointments from outside the Court effectively compromised the SCC's
ability to challenge executive action.
After decades of rampant nepotism and exclusion of any candidate
remotely associated with or sympathetic to the MB, Egypt's judiciary
had become a co-opted institution whose thin notions of rule of law and
aversion to populist democracy prompted judges to oppose both the
youth revolutionaries and the MB.356 That the judges would suddenly
transform into vanguards of reform was improbable. Indeed, most
judges were members of the same political elite that had benefited both
348. Moustafa, Law Versus the State, supra note 8, at 924; Bentlage, supra note 157,
at 248.
349. Hamad, supra note 3, at 263 (citing Moustafa, Law Versus the State, supra note
8, at 924).
350. See Moustafa, Resistance, supra note 53, at 138-39 (noting the tradition of the
president selecting the most senior justice on the SCC to serve as Chief Justice).
351. Hamad, supra note 3, at 263; LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW, supra
note 8, at 146 (noting that prior to the expansion of the SCC, a judgment was final after
seven justices signed it and the justices' votes are secret).
352. Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme ConstitutionalCourt, supra note 185, at 250-51.
353. Id.; Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note 8, at 421.
354. Hamad, supra note 3, at 264-65.
355. Id. at 265. See Asia Bali, From Subjects to Citizens? The Shifting Paradigm of
ElectoralAuthoritarianismin Egypt, 1 MIDDLE EAST L. & Gov. 38 (2009) 80-81 & fn
108 (discussing the adverse effect on judicial independence of Mubarak's appointment of
three Chief Justices from outside the SCC).
356. Nathan J. Brown, JudicialTurbulence Ahead in Egypt, Fasten Your Seat Belts,
CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR
INT'L
PEACE
(June
6,
2012),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/06/judicial-turbulence-ahead-in-egypt-fastenyour-seat-belts/b689.
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financially and politically from the authoritarian state.357 Similarly, the
prosecutors responsible for investigating the facts of prosecutions of
Mubarak and his cronies were the same ones who had propped up the
Mubarak regime for decades.
V.

THE POST-UPRISING PARADOX: COOPTED AND UNACCOUNTABLE

Despite the judiciary's relative autonomy as compared to other state
institutions, the executive imposed sufficient constraints over time to
produce a conservative judicial leadership with material interests in
preserving the political status quo.358 Judges' financial and status
interests, coupled with deep anti-Brotherhood biases, caused members of
the judiciary to forgive the past regime's transgressions as negligible
compared to what many judges anticipated from the Morsi regime. That
is, revolutionary demands for judicial reforms would displace judges'
sons and nephews from coveted judicial appointments, restrict judges
from taking lucrative secondments in ministries, and oust incumbent
senior judges from the highest courts. Calls for increased transparency in
judicial governance would expose the nepotism and corruption within the
Judges Club and impose judicial accountability. It is thus no surprise
that judicial institutions ultimately sided with the deep state in opposing
revolutionary changes to the political system.3 59
Signs of this alignment came to light as the Muslim Brotherhood's
Freedom and Justice Party ("FJP") rose to power in the parliament and
successfully fielded Dr. Mohamed Morsi as a presidential candidate in
2012.360 A series of events heightened tensions to such an extent that the
MB and the judiciary became locked in a war of attrition. Senior judges
successfully persuaded their colleagues-many of whom had refrained
from participating in past judicial activist proj ects-that Morsi was intent
on dismantling the judiciary only to reconstruct it as an Islamist
institution that would do the bidding of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Because the majority of judges were not Islamist in their worldview, by
executive design, sitting judges believed Morsi would replace them.
Thus, when key state institutions led by the military-security colluded to
oust Morsi, the judges surreptitiously supported such efforts. With few
357. See Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court, supra note 185, at 239
("[J]udicial appointments are... controlled to a large extent by hegemonic political
elites; and arguable, judges 'mirrored the cultural propensities and policy preferences of
these hegemonic elites."').
358. Ginsburg, supranote 108, at 727.
359. See Nathan J. Brown, Egypt's Failed Transition, Tracking the "Arab Spring",
24 J, DEMOCRACY 45, 50-53 (2013) [hereinafter Brown, Egypt's Failed Transition]
(discussing bad behavior and decisions that led to the failure of democracy).
360. Intisar Rabb, The Least Religious Branch? JudicialReview and the New Islamic
Constitutionalism, 17 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 77 n.5, 116, 120 (2013).
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real allies within a centralized state apparatus, Morsi's deposal was
inevitable.361
Accordingly, this section expounds on two key points in support of
this Article's thesis: 1) the judicial leadership and a large portion of the
judiciary viewed the revolution as a threat to their interests to such an
extent that a democratically elected president seeking judicial reforms
was a foe; and 2) the youth activists that ignited the revolution had to be
subdued because their demands for (thick) rule of law and judicial
accountability threatened judicial preferences. Most judges by virtue of
their elite status identified more with unpopular political elites than
populist groups calling for greater democracy.362 As a result, the
judiciary facilitated Interim President Mansour and current President
Sisi's crackdown on political dissent. Judges found they had little to
gain and a lot to lose from revolutionary political and socio-economic
change that entailed meaningful judicial accountability.
A.

The War of Attrition between Morsi 's Regime and the Judiciary

After a heated presidential campaign against former Mubarak
official Ahmed Shafik, Mohamed Morsi won by a slim margin. His
affiliation with an opposition group long vilified as sympathetic to
terrorists made his legitimacy all the more fragile. Morsi's regime, thus,
had little room for error. Morsi and his cabinet's political inexperience
proved fatal and ultimately resulted in his forced removal on July 3,
2013, via a military coup. While a full explication of the plethora of
political mistakes made by Morsi's regime is beyond the scope of this
Article, this section highlights four key missteps that further alienated a
skeptical judiciary.363 The following events brought the silent majority
of otherwise co-opted judges out of their quietist stance into the arms of
Ahmed A1-Zind's activist opposition: 1) FJP parliamentarians called for
abolishing the SCC and transferring its jurisdiction to the Court of
Cassation; 2) Morsi proposed amendments to the Judicial Authority law
that would force out thousands of senior judges by decreasing the
retirement age by ten years, leading to their anticipated replacement with
MB loyalist lawyers; 3) Morsi cut the SCC from 18 to 11 Justices as a
means of removing senior justices who were vocally challenging Morsi's

361. Sahar Aziz, Egypt's War of Attrition, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Apr. 7, 2013),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/20134710923332904.html
362. See Mednicoff, supra note 9, at 264.
363. Brown, Failed, supra note 359, at 57 (arguing that Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood made every conceivable political mistake including failing to build
coalitions with others, alienating potential allies, ignoring rising discontent, using rhetoric
that was tone deaf and sometimes threatening, and consolidating their rule).
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legitimacy; and 4) a constitutional declaration in November 2012 made
Morsi's executive actions immune from judicial review.
The judges' general distrust of the MB-who for decades had been
vilified as a secretive, menacing group with questionable national
loyalties-placed Morsi's action under heightened scrutiny. When some
its4
FJP parliamentarians called for abolishing the SCC and transferring 36
authorities to the Court of Cassation, these suspicions were confirmed.
The SCC responded by issuing a far-reaching opinion on June 14, 2012,
finding that the new election law passed by the SCAF was
unconstitutional because it did not offer independent candidates equal
opportumity as party list candidates to run for office. As a result, the
SCC dissolved the FJP-dominated lower house just weeks before Morsi
took office.365 Responding to allegations of questionable legal grounds
for dissolving the parliament, the SCC. pointed to its 1990 decision,
wherein it dissolved the People's Assembly on similar grounds, as
precedent.36 6 By leaving Morsi without a parliament, the Court
effectively emasculated the office of the presidency and left Morsi more
dependent on the judiciary to legitimize his presidential decrees. 367 The
MB perceived this sweeping decision as an act of political warfare that
warranted taming an activist Court.368
Morsi's recommended reforms to the JAL further confirmed the
judges' suspicions of a frontal assault on the judiciary. Specifically,
mandatory retirement would be decreased from 70 to 60 years of age,
consistent with other state institutions. 369 Because the Ministry of Justice
had authority over judicial appointments, the thousands of vacancies
arising from the new law would remove the most senior judges, who also
tended to be the most loyal to the Mubarak regime, and replace them
with judges vetted by the Morsi regime. 370 Because Morsi's regime
364. Sahar Aziz, Egypt's ProtractedRevolution, 19 HuM. RTS. BRIEF No. 3, 2, 8-9
(2012).
365.

Rabb, supra note 360, at 121; see JASON BROWNLEE,DEMOCRACY PREVENTION:

Maswood & Natarajan,
supranote 343, at 244.
366. Sherif, supra note 280, at 7-9.
367. The revolutionary opposition accused the MB of engaging in the same cronyism
under Mubarak by installing MB loyalists into key government positions and institutions
as part of a broader agenda to control the political system. Id. at 81-82.
368. Bassem Sabry, Eight Questions on 'Purging'of Egypt's Judiciary,AL-MONITOR
http://www.al2013),
24,
(Apr.
monitor.com/pulse/en/contents/articles/originals/2013/04/eight-questions-purgingegyptian-judiciary.html#.
369. IBAHRI, supra note 58, Annex B, at 66.
370. Id. at 36; see, e.g., Kareem Fahim, In Upheavalfor Egypt, Morsi Forces Out
2012),
12,
(Aug.
TIMES
Chiefs,
N.Y.
Military
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/13/world/middleeast/egyptian-leader-ousts-militarychiefs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing the forced retirement of Field Marshal
THE POLITICS OF THE U.S.-EGYPTIAN ALLIANCE xi-xii (2012);
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adopted the same nepotistic and crony practices as his predecessors in
executive appointments, most judges reasonably suspected the new
judges would be friends and family of FJP members.37 1 Morsi's regime
rebuked accusations of political motives by pointing to the other state
institutions and ministries where 60 had been the retirement age for
decades. In his view, there was no reason to treat the judiciary
differently.372 Indeed, Mubarak had extended judges' retirement age
multiple times over the past decade in order to retain loyalists at the helm
of judicial institutions.373
However, Morsi's claims of good faith were undermined by street
protests in April 2013 where MB supporters called for a purge of the
judiciary.37 4 The protesters accused senior judges of being loyal to the
former Mubarak regime and actively engaging in countering the
revolution. 375 The dispute became so contentious that Justice Minister
Ahmed Mekky, a reputable figure in the 2005-2006 independence
movement, was compelled to resign out of concern for judicial
independence.3 76 The Morsi regime's coercive tactics were becoming
wearily similar to Mubarak's but for its lack of allies within the
judiciary.
Morsi also sought to enforce Articles 41 and 47 of the JAL that
required a quarter of the judges in the Courts of First Instance to be
selected from practicing lawyers.377 If successful, Morsi would be the
first president to enforce this provision. This sudden and large influx of
judges had the potential to transform the judiciary's political leanings
and pave the way for additional Brotherhood-friendly judges in the
Tantawi); see, e.g.,

Egypt President Mohamed Morsi Forces Top Generals to Retire,

GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/12/mohamedmorsi-orders-generals-retire (discussing the forced retirement of Sami Enan, Chief of
Staff).
371. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 27 (reporting that Judge Mahmoud Hamza in the
Court of First Instance in Cairo was removed from his Cairo post in a suspected
retaliatory decision by the Prosecutor General's office). Indeed, judges who had ruled
against the regime on key political cases were suddenly transferred to other courts. Id.
372. Id. at 37; Sabry, supra note 368; see Rights Groups Condemn Forced Retirement
of 41 Judges for Expressing their Opinions, CArRO INST. FOR HUM. RTs. STUD. (Mar. 18,
2015), http://www.cihrs.org/?p= 14650&lang=en.
373. See, e.g., Law No. 183 of 1993 (Increasing the Retirement Age from 60 to 64),
al-Jarldahal-RasmTyah, 1993 (Egypt); Law No. 3 of 2002 (Increasing the Retirement
Age from 64 to 66), al-Jarldah al-Rasmiyah, 2002 (Egypt); Law No. 159 of 2003
(Increasing the Retirement Age from 66 to 68), al-Jarfdah al-Rasmiyah, 2003 (Egypt);
Law No. 17 of 2007 (Increasing Retirement Age from 68 to 70), al-Jarfdah al-Rasmfyah,
2007 (Egypt).
374. Sabry, supra note 368.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jaridah al-Rasmyah, 1972,
art. 41 (Egypt).
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future. For the security-military apparatus, this change would have
posed a serious threat to its plans to use the judiciary to weaken the
Morsi presidency and legitimize its return to power.378
The judges were equally distressed about the threat that Morsi's
379 Like
proposed amendments posed to the judiciary's hiring practices.
3 80 The
other state institutions, the judiciary is wrought with nepotism.
appointment process is not fully meritocratic; judges' sons and nephews
often become judges even if their academic records would not otherwise
qualify them. 381 For instance, the International Bar Association Human
Rights Institute reported that the President of the Tanta Court has 21 sons
and nephews who are either judges or prosecutors despite academic
382
records that disqualified some of them from judicial appointment.
Upon appointment, judges benefit from special treatment arising from
their fathers and uncles in the judiciary who lobby on their behalf for
transfer requests, disbursement of fringe benefits, and promotions.
Likewise, sons of senior judges receive preferential treatment in their
requests for leaves of absence, secondments, and requests for court
transfers.383 Moreover, the SJC is weary of approving disciplinary
384
actions against the sons of special counselors or senior judges.
Although the FJP's draft JAL maintained the Minister of Justice's
authority to appoint judges to executive bodies, it limited the terms of
secondments to once in a judge's career for up to four consecutive
385
Secondments were also limited to positions that required
years.
judicial or legal work.386 Article 44 of the draft law tightened the criteria
for judicial employment in appointment or promotion to be "on the basis
of competence, without favoritism or intercession and in line with the
principles of efficiency and academic appropriateness," and Article 62
would limit secondments to the state's departments and public bodies for
purposes of performing judicial or legal work.387 Notably, Morsi wanted
378. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 260.
379. Carothers, supra note 1, at 120.
380. See Golub, supra note 100, at 123 (noting that favoring relatives and friends is
what one does to be a good family or community member).
381. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 25; Bernard-Maugiron, supranote 225, at 8.
382. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 25; see also Auf, supra note 108 (discussing reform
due to the current process of selecting judges based upon personal connections or status).
383. Id.
384. Golub, supra note 101, at 120.
385. IBAHRI, supra note 58, Annex B at 63.
386. Id., Annex B at 62; see also FREEDOM AND JUSTICE PARTY, ELECTION PROGRAM
13 (2011), http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/FJP_2011 _English.pdf ("Prohibiting
assignment or secondment of judges to positions in ministries and executive branch
authorities during their work in the judiciary, taking charge of governance.").
387. Freedom & Justice Party, Draft Judicial Authority Law, arts. 44 & 62; IBAHRI,
supra note 58, at 38, Annex B, at 63.
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to keep final approval of judicial employment within the authority of the
president of the republic.38 8 The proposed amendment was presumably
intended to decrease the nepotism that nearly guaranteed that sitting
judges would hire their sons and nephews who were unlikely to be
Brotherhood sympathizers. The proposed law also kept the final say on
judicial appointments with the Brotherhood-dominated presidency.
Despite Morsi's proclaimed commitment to rule of law, he proved no
different than Mubarak in his attempts to retain control over the
38 9
judiciary.
The tensions between the FJP and the judiciary were most acute in
relations with the SCC. The Court viewed itself as the most prestigious
judicial institution that deserved its own section in the constitution and
complete control over its budget and assignments, separate from other
courts. 3 ° When the judges demanded salary increases, the FJP proposed
all judges be paid at the same levels as the SCC Justices. 39 1 The justices
viewed this as a direct economic threat, as well as a political blow to the
SCC's prestige.392 Moreover, if the rumors were true that the justices
were higher paid than senior judges on other courts, there would likely
be a readjustment of salaries adverse to the SCC justices' salaries. As of
the writing of this Article, the justices salaries remain secret despite
3 93
lawsuits seeking their disclosure.
Another strike against the SCC came when the Morsi-appointed
constituent assembly cut the number of SCC justices from 18 to 11. This
resulted in the removal of Justice Tehany Al Gibally, the most vocal
critic of the MB, as well as other justices viewed as hostile to Morsi's
agenda.394 Morsi's legal advisors defended the decision by claiming it
388. IBAHRI, supra note 58, Annex B at 63-64.
389. Brown, Egypt's Failed Transition, supra note 363, at 51 (noting that Morsi's
regime was accused of using force against protestors, trying to purge the judiciary,
harassing the media, prosecuting political dissenters, and failing to stop security-force
abuse of citizens); IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 50 (noting the case of youth activist Ahmed
Douma, who was put on trial for insulting President Morsi and transferred to the Tanta
Court before a harsh judge, rather than the court in the jurisdiction where the alleged
crime took place).
390. See generally IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 16, 33.
391. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 38.
392. See generally Ziad Abdel Tawab, The PoliticalPathology of the Egyptian State,
EGYPTSOURCE (June 19, 2012), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/thepolitical-pathology-of-the-egyptian-state (discussing the political threat facing Egyptian
courts).
393. ConstitutionalCourt to Ignore Ruling on Judge Salary Disclosure, CAIRO POST
(Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.thecairopost.com/news/138932/inside-egypt/constitutionalcourt-not-to-consider-appeal-on-judge-salary-disclosure.
394. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 30; Yasmine El Rashidi, Egypt: Whose Constitution?,
N.
Y. .
REv.
BOOKS
(Jan.
13,
2013),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/j an/03/egypt-whose-constitution/ ("[T]he
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was a cost-saving measure that aligned the number of judges with those
of other courts around the world.395 Months later, the constitutionality of
the constituent assembly was before the SCC. On the day of the
scheduled hearing, Morsi supporters held a boisterous sit-in surrounding
court house.3 96
the SCC that prevented the justices from entering the
Nevertheless, the SCC issued a ruling finding that the constituent
assembly was illegal on the grounds that the means in which it was
created contravened the constitution.397 Morsi supporters accused the
abusing its authority to politically retaliate against Morsi's
SCC of
3 98
regime.
Further weakening the SCC, the constituent assembly removed its
ex post judicial review and limited it to ex ante review. As a result, once
a law was passed, the SCC lost its jurisdiction to determine the law's
constitutionality. Despite Morsi's claim that this change reflected the
French legal system, the strategy proved fatal to Morsi's attempts to
install a parliament during his first, and only, year as president. Striking
back against Morsi, the SCC repeatedly rejected drafts of the election
law sent by the Shura Council, thereby impeding elections for a new
lower house of parliament.3 99 Morsi was forced to govern through
presidential decrees rather than laws issued by an elected legislative
branch, further eroding his legitimacy.
The constitutional declaration of November 22, 2012, was Morsi's
most controversial executive act and arguably the death knell of his
administration. He justified the declaration as a response to an alleged
conspiracy by former regime foes, opposition politicians, and judges to
dissolve the constituent assembly and disband the Shura Council-all of
which would leave a shell of a presidency and pave the way for de facto
military tutelage. 40 0 The declaration imposed a new four-year term on
the Prosecutor General, which authorized Morsi to replace Mubarak40 1 He also
appointed Abdel Meguid Mahmoud with Talaat Abdullah.
constitution decreases the number of members on the SCC from 18 to 11 -a move that is
worded in a manner intended to get rid of the outspoken, secular, members of the court,
such as the female judge and Mubarak appointee Tahani El-Gebaly.").
395. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 31.
396. Sabry, supra note 368.
397. Nouran El-Behairy, SCC Deems Shura Council and Constituent Assembly
2013),
2,
(June
EGYPT
NEWS
DAILY
Unconstitutional,
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/02/scc-deems-shura-council-and-constituentassembly-unconstitutional/.
398. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 13.
399. See Maswood & Natarajan, supra note 343, at 231 ("In the 1980s, the SCC twice
struck down electoral laws, causing the dissolution of parliament and new elections.").
400. See Brown, Egypt's Failed Transition, supra note 363, at 49.
401. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan, 2014, art. 189
(available in English at http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en00l.pdf).
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revoked the power of the SCC to declare parliament or the constituent
assembly unconstitutional.4 °2 To ensure the courts could not reverse his
decisions, Morsi placed his presidential decrees above judicial review
altogether.
Because this declaration was perceived as a direct attack on judicial
independence, Morsi's unpopularity expanded beyond the top echelon of
the judiciary to the majority of judges.40 3 The head of the Judges Club,
Ahmed Al Zind, rallied judges against Morsi, calling for his removal. 4°
Al Zind's political activities, arguably in violation of the JAL, made him
a lightning rod in rallying the judiciary in support of the July 3rd military
coup. 4°5 Al Zind's loyalties to the former regime and animosity toward
the 2005-2006 judicial independence movement were well known,
making him a powerful figure within internal judicial coalitions that
supported the ouster Morsi in July 2013.4 o6 Demonstrating how effective
the judges were in damaging the regime's legitimacy, Morsi took the
unprecedented step of naming specific judges as corrupt, fraudulent, and
politicized in a nationally televised speech on June 26, 2013. 4°7 It would
be the last time the nation saw Morsi before the military whisked him
away to a secret prison on July 3, 2013.
B.

The Counter-Revolution

The military-security forces that seized control of the presidency
were keen to ensure the revolutionary movement would be completely
quashed. To this end, they engaged in a violent crusade to punish the
youth revolutionaries who had led the January 2 5 th uprisings and the
Muslim Brotherhood which had leveraged the momentum to win
elections. The judicial leadership's longstanding loyalty to the regime,
coupled with a critical mass of judges that distrusted the MB,

402.
403.
404.

Id. at art. 5.
IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 11.
See Samer al-Atrush, Egypt Judges Back ProsecutorAgainst Morsi, MoRocco
WORLD NEWS (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/tag/egypt-judgesback-prosecutor-against-morsi/?print=pdf-page.
405. See Tom Perry, Egypt's Mursi Faces Judicial Revolt Over Decree, Reuters (Nov.
24,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-presidentidUSBRE8AMODO20121124.
406. See David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, In Cairo, Effort to Broaden Support
for
Charter,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Dec.
11,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/1 2 /12/world/middleeast/egypt-morsi-referendumIntemational-Monetary-Fund-.html"
407. IBAHRI, supra note 58, at 14.
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transformed the judiciary into a political ally in President Mansour and
Sisi's crackdown on dissent.4 °8
Under the guise of countering terrorism, the military-backed interim
government of Adly Mansour brutally quelled the protests at Raba'a
Square and Nahda Square. The crackdown resulted in over 900
casualties of unarmed civilians. Meanwhile, police arrested and detained
nearly every Morsi regime official. Many were charged with trumped up
charges of threatening national security that made them eligible for the
death penalty. To facilitate prosecuting the MB membership and
supporters, the government designated the MB as a terrorist group-a
move which met little resistance from the judges. This paved the way for
closing the MB's social service organizations that provided much needed
food, medical care, and shelter to millions of rural and urban poor
Egyptians. 40 9 The Sisi regime also shut down the MB's businesses and
had their assets frozen.410
Through specially created national security circuits within the
ordinary courts of first instance, senior judges in coordination with the
Ministry of Justice assigned loyalist subordinate judges who duly
disregarded incriminating evidence, exercised their discretion in favor of
the prosecution, and ultimately issued mass death sentences. And while
the executive's use of the judiciary to impose its political agenda has a
long tradition in Egypt, as discussed in previous sections, this time the
judges are cooperating not out of fear of executive retribution but rather
in support of authoritarianism. Their conviction that such harsh
crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood and youth activists are
warranted to preserve rule of law exposes the contested notions of rule of
law underpinning Egypt's political turmoil. Specifically, in the name of
(thin) rule of law, the Guardians of the law have joined an authoritarian
executive to subdue political opposition whose411basis for opposing the
of law.shift.It will take years to
ruleseismic
for (thick)
is their demands
regime
of this
the implications
fully understand
408. See Maha Abdelrahman, Report Thy Neighbour: Policing Sisi's Egypt, Open
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/maha2015),
23,
(Feb.
Democracy
abdelrahman/report-thy-neighbour-policing-sisi%E2%80%99s-egYpt.
Activities, REUTERS (Sept. 23,
409. See Egypt Court Bans All Muslim Brotherhood
2
http://www.reuters.com/article/ 013/09/23/us-egypt-brotherhood-urgent2013),
idUSBRE98MOHL20130923; Lombardi, Constitution as Agreement to Agree, supra note
8, at 403-04 (discussing the rise in popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood as due in part
to their provision of social services to the poor).
Entities' Law, DAILY NEWS
410. Nourhan Fahmy, President Approves 'Terrorist
2
EGYPT (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/ 015/02/24/president-approvesterrorist-entities-law/.
411.

See BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 115, at 119

(arguing that starting in the 1990s the SCC departed from its "traditional judicial focus to
advance a substantive, and not simply procedural, view of the rule of law").
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As former Mubarak officials were released from jail with minimal,
if any, accountability for their criminal actions, Morsi officials were
aggressively prosecuted with terrorism charges. After being abducted
from the presidential palace on July 3, 2013, by military officials,
Mohamed Morsi was publicly charged on November 3, 2014, for
escaping from Wadi Al-Natrun Prison during the uprisings on January
29, 2011; inciting MB supporters to kill ten people outside of the
presidential palace on December 4, 2012; espionage for allegedly
conspiring with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran's Revolutionary Guard
based on his alleged presidential meetings with these entities; and
insulting the Egyptian judiciary.4 12 As of the writing of this Article,
Morsi has been sentenced to death and remains in custody pending his
413
appeal.

Mohamed Badie, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood
that detractors accused was ruling Egypt instead of Morsi, was charged
with murder and inciting violence on multiple occasions in July and
August of 2013.414 On April 29, 2014, Badie, along with hundreds of
other defendants, were sentenced en masse to death for deadly riots that
took place in Minya after Morsi was deposed. Badie was also sentenced
to life in prison for inciting violence on a major road north of Cairo and
clashes outside of al-Istiqama Mosque in July 2013.415 The 15 minute
hearing preceding the death sentences was conducted without a single
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2014),
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lawyer present for the defense, and thus invited sharp condemnation
41 6 Other
from foreign governments and the international community.
Morsi officials charged and currently detained include Amr Darrag
(former Minister of International Cooperation), Essam Al-Hadded
(former Chief of Staff for the President), Aymen Ali (former advisor for
Expatriate Affairs), Moahmed Saad Al-Katatni (former Speaker of the
People's Assembly), and Khaled Al-Qazzaz (former Minister of Foreign
Relations).4 17 They have been indicted on charges ranging from harming
national security, to spreading false news, collaborating with foreign
groups to commit terrorism, inciting violence during protests, and
insulting the judiciary. Although the executive remained firm in its
stance that the MB is a terrorist organization, the judiciary is paying a
high cost in terms of its legitimacy. Multiple hearings have been held
without basic due process rights. For instance, defense attorneys were
denied access to the prosecution's evidence, exculpatory evidence was
excluded, and defense counsel was not given sufficient time to prepare
for trial.418 As a result, Egyptians increasingly view the judiciary as an
active participant, rather than an impartial check, on the military's
manipulation of law to perpetuate a political vendetta against the Morsi
regime.
This judicialization of politics has spread, with the judiciary's
blessing, to the regime's retaliation against the youth activists who lead
416.
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the January 2 5th uprisings. International organizations and human rights
lawyers have condemned the prosecutions as politicized and in violation
of the rights of assembly and expression. 419 Leaders of the April 6 th
movement, who played an instrumental role in mobilizing Egyptians to
stand up to Mubarak's repressive security forces in the heady days
following January 25th, are now in jail for years for minor infractions of
an anti-protest law passed in haste by interim president Adly Mansour
with no sitting legislature.420 Youth activists Ahmed Maher, Mohamed
Adel, Ahmed Abdallah, and Alaa Abdel Fatah were convicted for
inciting and organizing illegal protests.42 1 Maher, Adel, and Abdallah
were sentenced to three years in prison and fined 50,000 Egyptian
pounds while Abdel Fatah has been sentenced to five years.422 Yara
Sallam, a human rights lawyer and graduate of the elite American
University in Cairo, was arrested on charges of violating the protest law
merely for being in the vicinity of a protest march in Cairo.42 3 Like the
others, she was sentenced to three years, which was later reduced to two
years on appeal. 424 In response to international pressure, Sisi pardoned

Sallam along with other detainees in October 2015 just before he
travelled to the United Nations annual conference in New York.425
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Sanaa Seif is another prominent female activist who has been on the
frontlines of Egypt's democratization movement dating back to the early
2000s. Seif is a co-founder of Egypt's "No to Military Trials for
Civilians" that has been tirelessly demanding the end of transferring
civilians to military trials in order to obtain speedy convictions in
political cases.426 Using military courts to try civilians was among
Mubarak's strategies to penalize the judiciary for exercising too much
autonomy.427 Military courts had jurisdiction to try any crime committed
in a location operated by or for the military, including commercial
places. 428 These courts were an effective mechanism for expedited
prosecution of dissidents because the judges are military officers
appointed by the Minister of Defense and the President for two-year
renewable terms. 429 Due to their institutional identity and legal training,
military judges are more deferential and apply limited due process,
making a conviction nearly guaranteed. 430 The trials are held in secret
and defendants have no right to appeal to civilian courts. 431 The
president has discretion to decide if any crime under the Penal Code can
be tried by a military court.432 For these reasons, Seif and her colleagues
were protesting the continued use of military courts to try civilian
political dissenters, and as a result she was a target of government
repression.433 Seif was arrested in June 2014 when protesting for the
43 4
freedom of her brother, Alaa Abdel Fattah, and against the protest law.
She was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison in October
2014, which was reduced to two years on appeal.435 Seif was also among
those pardoned by Sisi in October 2015.436
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Ahmed Douma, another prominent youth activist, was charged with
organizing illegal protests and assaulting police officers during a
protest.437 Judge Mohamed Nagi Shehata, who has been assigned many
post-July 3, 2013 cases involving the MB and youth activists, presided
over Douma's case. 43 8 Douma was initially sentenced to three years in
prison and fined 50,000 Egyptian pounds, but, after a retrial, Judge
Shehata sentenced him to life in prison.4 39 That Douma had openly
denounced the trial as political and accused the judge of bias likely
contributed to his harsh sentence. 440 By prosecuting the activists and
raising the liberty stakes, the regime aims to quash the youth
revolutionary movement through fear and deterrence. The judiciary's
disdain for the revolution facilitated this agenda and, in contrast to past
regimes, the use of special courts to try the political opposition was
unnecessary.
But political retaliation did not end there. Reformist judges whose
activism over the past decade had emboldened civil society to expand
their activism from the courtrooms into the streets were also targeted. Al
Zind actively called for aggressive prosecutions of judges who
participated in the independence movement of 2005-2006.44 1 Al Zind
led the charge within the judiciary to discipline and expel those judges
who publicly condemned the ouster of Morsi as an illegal coup." 2
Judges who openly aligned themselves with the Morsi regime, whether
by supporting his legal decrees or condemning the events of July 3 rd as a
military coup, are currently targets of internal disciplinary investigations
with minimal due process rights." 3 Ironically, Zind and his followers,
who openly condemned Morsi as an incompetent president (an arguably
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political activity), are now accusing reformist judges of violating the JAL
provision prohibiting judges from engaging in politics. That disciplinary
proceedings have been selectively opened against some judges but not
others demonstrates that the proceedings are aimed to punish a judge's
non-alignment with A1-Zind rather than to objectively determine that a
particular judge violated the JAL.
By the end of the summer of 2015, it was clear that key members of
the judicial leadership had actively supported the deep state and business
elite in ousting Morsi and the MB from power. Meanwhile, the vast
majority of judges kept quiet, as they were all too familiar with the high
price of betting on the losing side of a high stakes political game. And
justifiably so, as the minority that spoke out against the military's
takeover of the presidency through the proxy of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, were purged from the
judiciary.444 Hence judicial activism is rewarded so long as it was in
favor of the security-military apparatus-one of the bastions of the
authoritarian state that was in control throughout Egypt's purported
transitional period. More than four years after Egypt's uprising, the
judiciary has proven to be a formidable deep state institution, guarding
its material interests in the status quo even if it means betraying rule of
law.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I offer a nuanced explanation to an important
question: what role did Egypt's judiciary play in Egypt's failed
transition to democracy. To be sure, judges missed a historic opportunity
to leverage the revolutionary fervor gripping the nation to finally
implement meaningful judicial reforms. Instead, the judiciary opted to
support another military-backed regime. Thus, I challenge the dominant
narrative in the political science and comparative law literature
portraying Egypt's judiciary as a relatively independent institution that is
a regional exemplar in its commitment to rule of law and horizontal
accountability. 445 In doing so, I bring to the forefront two paradoxes of
Egypt's judiciary: 1) it is co-opted and independent; and 2) it wants
judicial independence without judicial accountability. On the one hand,
444.
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the broader authoritarian context in which Egypt's judiciary has operated
since its inception subjects judges to various means of co-optation to
which a majority of judges now succumb. On the other, the judiciary
valiantly fought executive infringements for over a century with mixed
success.
The judges' commitment to rule of law, and more specifically
judicial independence, was compromised by their individual preferences
for access to lucrative secondments, nepotistic and exclusivist hiring
practices, an extended retirement age of seventy, and other fringe
benefits.
Judges' conception of judicial independence without
accountability ultimately caused the judiciary to ally with the militarysecurity apparatus in countering the revolution. That is, if judicial
independence from executive interferences entailed accountability to the
people, the judges chose to have neither.

